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## Actions and Reactions
## The Spring 1862 Shenandoah Valley Campaign Revisted

By Robert S. Rush

Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson's 1862 campaign in Virginia's Shenandoah Valley prolonged the life of the Confederacy by two to three years. Within a one-month period, his Confederate Valley Army, never exceeding 17,000 men, marched more than 200 miles, fought three battles, and neutralized more than 70,000 Union soldiers in a campaign that caused the Federal focus to shift, at least momentarily, from the peninsula formed by the York and James Rivers to the Shenandoah Valley. During this period Jackson took advantage of every opportunity in pursuing his primary objective to keep Union troops from reinforcing Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's Army of the Potomac in its drive on Richmond, Virginia.

Decisions made by the Union's senior civilian leaders also contributed to General Jackson's success. If President Abraham Lincoln and Secretary of War Edwin Stanton had not influenced the Federal military strategy in the valley, General McClellan's Peninsula campaign might have attained its strategic goal. Instructions issued by Secretary Stanton, not any victories won by General Jackson, effectively stopped Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks' successful march up the valley toward Staunton in April 1862. Jackson's subsequent military successes against Banks at Front Royal and Winchester are directly attributable to Stanton's actions, which reduced Banks' force from 23,000 soldiers at the beginning of May to fewer than 9,000 by 21 May.[1]

For the Confederates, General Robert E. Lee's efforts to have Jackson attack resulted in a diversion into the valley of 20,000 Union soldiers who would have better served the Federal cause by participating in the battles around Richmond. Had Maj. Gen. Irwin McDowell's corps been available to McClellan in late May, General Joseph E. Johnston and his 60,000 soldiers of the Army of Northern Virginia would have faced a combined Union force of more than 135,000, or an imbalance of roughly two to one. Defeating the Army of Northern Virginia would have cleared the way for General McClellan to take first Richmond and then all of Virginia with its substantial population and industrial and agricultural output.[2] In that case, the war might not have lasted another year.

The use of the telegraph made the Shenandoah Valley campaign one of the first in which civilian government officials could influence events almost instantaneously, without openly campaigning themselves. As a byproduct, this situation left a legacy of excellent primary sources. Published in the *War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, these communications are the only sources that were not modified to fit perception or memory, as were after-action reports and personal accounts. Relying on the *Official Records* and the personal papers of the participants, this article will evaluate the effects of the messages received by those involved in the Valley campaign and suggest how these directives influenced its course. The paper will compare the understanding and instructions of higher headquarters with the reality of the battlefield situation. Among the significant challenges Generals Banks and Jackson faced was the need to balance reality with their superiors' perceptions. Military campaigns are not fought in vacuums. The Shenandoah Valley campaign is a primer on how individuals off the battlefield can decisively influence a campaign.

### An Overview of the Eastern Theater

On 21 April 1862, the American Civil War was just over a year old. After the bloody First Battle of Manassas, fought between the ill-prepared forces of

the Union and Confederate armies in July 1861, President Lincoln had given the command of the Union forces to General McClellan. While "Little Mac" organized and trained the Army of the Potomac around Washington, just thirty miles west, General Johnston's Confederate Army of the Potomac went into winter quarters at Centreville, Virginia.

After watching McClellan intensively train the army around Washington for eight months, the president prodded him into moving against the Confederates. McClellan's initial plan to ferry his army to Urbana on the Rappahannock was thwarted when General Johnston pulled his army back to Fredericksburg. McClellan then proposed to move by sea to Union-held Fort Monroe located at the foot of the critical peninsula. This would place the Union army nearer to Richmond than was the Confederate army, and if McClellan moved quickly he could cut Johnston off in Northern Virginia. Although concerned about separating the main Union army from Washington, President Lincoln agreed to the plan.

On 14 March the president limited McClellan's command to the Army of the Potomac and organized the remaining Union forces in eastern and central Virginia into the Departments of the Shenandoah and Rappahannock. The commanders of those departments, Generals McDowell and Banks, would report directly to the president. Lincoln wanted McClellan to focus on the Peninsula campaign and would rely on other generals to ensure that Washington was defended. On 17 March 1862, McClellan's Army of the Potomac began embarking for Fort Monroe.

By 21 April 1862, the Union forces were closer to Richmond and to ending the war than they would be for the next two-and-a-half years. While General McClellan's 105,000-strong Army of the Potomac was marching up the peninsula southeast of Richmond, General McDowell's approximately 32,000 soldiers at Aquia Creek, about ten miles north of the Rappahannock River, waited for orders to resume their advance on Richmond. President Lincoln had ordered McDowell to move on Richmond by way of Manassas Junction and Fredericksburg on 3 April, but Secretary Stanton modified those orders on 11 April when he made clear to McDowell that the protection of Washington took priority over the move south. Stanton further restricted McDowell on 23 April by ordering him not to advance across the Rappahannock.[3]

Meanwhile, in the Department of the Shenandoah, General Banks' contingent of 15,000 soldiers was marching south up the Shenandoah Valley with its lead elements in Harrisonburg. West of the valley, in the Mountain Department that had been established earlier, Maj. Gen. John C. Frémont's army of 8,000 was slowly moving east through the Allegheny passes into the upper valley near Staunton. Brig. Gen. Louis Blenker and his division of 7,000 soldiers of German descent were marching west from Warrenton Junction to reinforce Frémont.[4]

Banks and his corps had arrived in the Shenandoah Valley in February 1862 with the mission to protect Washington and defend the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Later that month McClellan, who then still commanded Banks, wired him to clear the valley of Confederate forces to forestall any attempt by the Confederates to move against Washington through the Blue

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Ridge Mountains. Banks was then to reunite his corps with the Army of the Potomac at Manassas Junction.

In late March Banks wired Washington that the Confederate forces had left the valley, and he put his corps in motion towards Manassas Junction. His opinion changed after 23 March, however, when General Jackson attacked Brig. Gen. James Shields' division at Kernstown, just south of Winchester. Although the battle was a clear victory for the North, it convinced Banks and his superiors that the Southerners were still in force in the valley. As a result, on 1 April McClellan notified Banks to drive Jackson up the valley and away from the Potomac River. That accomplished, his soldiers were to keep the Confederates away from the northern valley and the Blue Ridge Mountain passes.[5]

General Shields, one of Banks' more outspoken division commanders, wanted to accomplish more than just keeping Jackson away from the Potomac. He proposed to Secretary Stanton on 20 April that he take his and Blenker's divisions, along with the cavalry detachments of Brig. Gen. John T. Geary and Brig. Gen. Louis Abercrombie, and march on Richmond from the west. Stanton sent no reply to his proposal.[6]

West of the Shenandoah in the Mountain Department, General Frémont wanted to capture Knoxville, Tennessee. He suggested to President Lincoln on 21 April that his army move into the valley at Staunton, cut the railroad at Salem on the Roanoke River, and continue southwest toward Knoxville. Secretary Stanton approved Frémont's plan to capture the railroad but withheld final approval for taking Knoxville.[7]

For the Confederates, General Johnston's mission was to prevent the fall of Richmond while keeping the Southern army intact. To accomplish this, he had to keep his Army of Northern Virginia between General McClellan's Union army and Richmond, while simultaneously declining to fight a battle of attrition. Besides the forces he moved to face McClellan, Johnston commanded four small contingents in the Shenandoah and Rappahannock Valleys. Since McClellan's landing on the peninsula, he had had little time or energy to devote to the detachments and sent few messages to their commanders. He sent occasional communications to these elements by telegraph, but since there was no direct telegraph line between Johnston and the forces west of Gordonsville, most of his messages were routed through the

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Confederate War Department and the recently named General of Confederate Armies, Robert E. Lee.[8]

The outlying detachments, totaling 19,000 soldiers, opposed the 63,000 Union troops of Generals McDowell, Banks, and Frémont. Directly opposing Banks' move south was General Jackson's 6,000-man Army of the Valley, located at Conrad's Store (now Elkton) in the eastern valley. General Johnston's orders to Jackson were to prevent the Union forces in the valley from reinforcing General McClellan. Just south of the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg, 2,000 soldiers under the command of Brig. Gen. Charles W. Field warily watched McDowell's corps assemble on the opposite side of the river. On 21 April an additional 11,000 Confederate soldiers were marching to reinforce Field and his small command. About twenty miles west of Staunton, Brig. Gen. Edward Johnson and his two brigades of 2,800 soldiers each were camped on Shenandoah Mountain guarding the passes through the Allegheny Mountains against General Frémont and his army. The last detachment, comprising Maj. Gen. Richard S. Ewell's division of 8,000, was stationed along the upper Rappahannock protecting the wide area between Field's and Jackson's forces. Ewell's division was the only Confederate element not directly facing Union forces and could thus assist either Jackson or Field as the need arose.[9]

**Setting the Stage and Engendering Action**

General Lee believed that with the disparity of numbers in Virginia all Confederate forces had to focus on the defense of Richmond. Both he and General Johnston realized that to save Richmond, the relative strengths of the Confederate and Union armies had to remain close. For this to occur, the Confederates either had to interrupt Union army reinforcements going to McClellan or mass every Southern soldier available to defend Richmond. In mid-April, when Lee looked at the forces arrayed in Virginia, he believed there was an opportunity for Jackson and Ewell to hinder the Federal forces located northwest of Richmond. On 21 April he wired the two commanders to suggest they attack the Union forces near them in an effort to relieve the pressure on Fredericksburg.[10]

Lee's message encouraged Jackson to look for options other than waiting for Banks to attack him. Jackson's reply on the twenty-third outlined a plan to attack Banks' flank at either Harrisonburg or New Market if the Federals continued their advance toward Staunton. Jackson also let Lee know that although he favored attacking, he believed this contrary to Johnston's guidance.[11]

General Lee saw the Confederate situation around Fredericksburg worsen as more Union troops massed on the north side of the Rappahannock. On 25 April he again queried Ewell and Jackson if either saw an opportunity to attack. More specifically, he asked Ewell if, when combined with Jackson or Field, he saw any possibility of striking the Union forces along the Rappahannock. Lee mentioned to Jackson that the Federals were moving more men toward Fredericksburg: "For this purpose they must weaken other points, and now is the time to concentrate on any that may be exposed within our reach." He recommended that Jackson consider striking McDowell's forces around Warrenton if he could not attack Banks. Realizing that the changing situation would not allow him to select the best opportunity, Lee wrote Jackson: "I cannot pretend at this distance to direct operations depending on circumstances unknown to me and requiring the exercise of discretion and judgment as to time and execution."[12]

Although Lee was in contact with General Johnston daily by telegraph, he did not inform him of this series of messages between Lee, Jackson, and Ewell. Lee either felt it unnecessary to inform Johnston of his efforts to relieve the pressure on Fredericksburg or feared that Johnston might try to quash his efforts at encouraging Jackson or Ewell to attack the Federal forces opposite them.[13]

**Putting on the Brakes and Yielding the Initiative**

On 21 April, the same day Lee urged Jackson to strike, General Banks' Union columns were approaching Staunton. The Federal troops had been averaging three miles a day against Jackson's troops, watching them cautiously as they pulled back to the south and east. Although their pace was slow, it was still too fast for Secretary Stanton. Probably noting Jackson's main force sitting passively at Conrad's Store while the Union army marched past him down the western valley towards Staunton, the secretary of war wired Banks to congratulate him on the "activity and cautious vigor of his command," while at the same time admonishing

him not to let his column get too far from Winchester. On 25 April, when Banks reported his lead elements only eight miles from Staunton, Secretary Stanton stopped his move farther up the valley and informed him there was a good chance he would lose General Shields' division to General McDowell's command on the Rappahannock.[14]

At the time of Stanton's message, Banks' advance guard was outside Staunton, two brigades plus artillery were at Harrisonburg, one brigade was between Harrisonburg and New Market, and the remainder of his troops were at New Market. West of Staunton, General Frémont's lead brigade under Brig. Gen. Robert H. Milroy was slowly forcing General Edward Johnson's brigades back from the mountain passes.[15] Unwittingly, when Stanton halted Banks, he also prevented what Jackson feared most, Banks' merging with Frémont. If they had combined, Jackson and his army would have been reduced to watching the Union forces march freely up and down the valley.

Stymied by Stanton, Banks proposed on the twenty-eighth and again on the thirtieth to move his command against the Confederate forces to the east. He stated that Jackson had left the valley and that he believed that his forces were marching toward Gordonsville and Richmond. Banks offered to take his army and march through the Blue Ridge Mountains by way of either Luray or Madison, which would force Field to retreat from the Rappahannock. He hoped this would also enable the Federal forces to cut the rail line between Richmond and the Shenandoah Valley.[16]

Additionally, this advance would have forced Jackson to pull back toward Richmond or risk being cut off in the valley. General Banks got his reply on 1 May. Instead of approving Banks' plan of march, Secretary Stanton directed him simply to send Shields' division to General McDowell and to pull his remaining units back to the area surrounding Strasburg. Banks' command now consisted of Brig. Gen. Alpheus Williams' division of 8,000 soldiers, and his charge was not limited to protecting the lower valley and its railroad.[17]

Although Stanton must have believed he was correct to bolster the Union forces around Fredericksburg, his decision to remove Shields' division from Banks' command proved to be the cardinal error of the campaign. Both Banks and McDowell had reported that Jackson was moving out of the valley towards Richmond. With the Confederates gone, it would not appear cost-effective to keep 18,000 Federal soldiers in the valley to prevent small Confederate raids. What Shields' departure really did, however, was to leave Banks with barely enough strength to face Jackson alone, and against Jackson and Ewell combined he would be heavily outnumbered.

Within the Confederate lines, Jackson had watched Banks march up the valley turnpike into Harrisonburg. On 26 April, when Jackson thought Banks was about to attack his position, he called up Ewell's division. Jackson wanted Ewell's troops fresh, so he cautioned Ewell not to march his soldiers too hard. Ewell received another message the next day, telling him to continue his march to Swift Run Gap after his soldiers had rested.[18] Jackson may also have been considering executing an attack on Banks' flank, as he had earlier outlined to Lee.

During this period, sending a message from the Valley Army and receiving a response from Richmond required one-and-a-half to two days. There was no telegraph line through Swift Run Gap, so couriers carried the messages from Jackson's headquarters to Gordonsville, and from there they were telegraphed to Richmond. The couriers waited for a reply and then took it back to Conrad's Store. Often, messages passed one another in transit, confusing the recipients as to which question the answer pertained.

On 28 April Jackson wired Lee that he had called up Ewell's division. In the same message, he requested 5,000 reinforcements to join the attack on Banks. Lee wired back that there were no reinforcements to send. Additionally, Lee informed Jackson of the possibility of Ewell's being transferred to a more active front if Jackson did not attack soon.[19]

Like Stanton, Lee did not want to leave too many soldiers in an inactive theater. Both the North and South were looking at reducing the numbers of soldiers in and around the valley so they might participate in the critical phase of the campaign developing in the area between Fredericksburg, Richmond, and Williamsburg. Lee's message appears to have caused Jackson to review his available options. He faced much the same dilemma as did Banks. If Frémont joined Banks at Staunton, Jackson stood no chance of clearing the valley, even with Ewell's help. If Ewell left, his Valley Army would be outnumbered by either of the Union

columns. On the twenty-ninth Jackson offered Lee three offensive options for his Valley Army.

Jackson's first plan was to keep Ewell at Swift Run Gap to threaten Banks' rear while Jackson, combined with General Edward Johnson's brigade, attacked Frémont's forces west of Staunton. From there, they would march east, unite with Ewell's division, and defeat Banks. The second option, which he had earlier outlined to Lee, was to combine with Ewell to attack the Federal forces located just west of New Market. A successful attack, Jackson believed, would allow him to press forward, take New Market, and cut Banks off from his base of operations at Winchester. The third alternative was to march down past Luray toward Front Royal, cross the Shenandoah River, and threaten Winchester. Jackson preferred the first option, because it massed the combined Confederate strength against each Union detachment in turn and, unlike the latter options, did not require the Valley Army to cross either the Shenandoah River or Massanutten Mountain before launching its attack.[20]

General Ewell had also been receiving messages, not only from Lee, but also from Jackson, Field, and Johnston. His frustration with not knowing how to respond was apparent when he wired Lee on the thirtieth that "it seems important to me that the whole line, including the forces south of Fredericksburg (Generals Field and Anderson), should be under one general, authorized to combine them against any point deemed advisable. This does not seem the case at present."[21] Ewell wanted unity of command; he did not like the separate commands that were providing him conflicting guidance.

**The Campaign**

General Jackson did not wait for an answer before moving his army from Conrad's Store. Because of Banks' continued advance toward Staunton, Jackson must have decided he could no longer wait for Banks to come to him. On the afternoon of 30 April the Valley Army broke camp and began marching toward Port Republic. As its movement veered toward the Union positions near Harrisonburg, Banks reported he expected an attack, but then Jackson turned away and began to march east out of the valley. Rain began falling, and the army pressed on five miles in the mud. During the night, Ewell's division moved into the area around Conrad's Store and bedded down at the Valley Army's old campsite.[22]

Jackson received a reply to his options message while on the march. Lee left the selection up to Jackson and simply warned him not to waste his soldiers in operations that would not improve the overall situation.[23]

Accounts written after the battle maintain that Jackson had planned from the beginning to reinforce General Edward Johnson and to strike Frémont's lead brigade. Jackson's message to Ewell on 3 May throws doubt on that assumption, however. That message informed Ewell that their plan to turn Banks by way of New Market would not work as long as Federal forces remained strong there. The next day Ewell learned that Jackson was marching toward West View to assist General Johnson, who was being pushed back by General Milroy's brigade of Frémont's army.[24]

The Valley Army's route was circuitous and thus gave the impression the Confederates were deserting

*General Jackson*

the valley. The army headed south from Conrad's Store through Port Republic, crossed the Blue Ridge Mountains at Browns Gap, and continued south to Mechums River Depot. There, the soldiers boarded commandeered trains that took them back into the valley, and they arrived in Staunton on 4 May.[25]

Jackson confirmed on 6 May that Banks had halted his movement toward Staunton and was pulling back to Harrisonburg. He saw this as his opportunity to strike General Milroy's advance brigade near the hamlet of McDowell without having to worry about Banks' moving forward and trapping him in the mountains west of Staunton. Jackson ordered Edward Johnson and his brigades forward to attack Milroy and followed with the remainder of his army on the seventh.[26]

Milroy was not totally surprised when he discovered Jackson in Staunton. Banks had wired Frémont on 2 May, telling him he believed Jackson was moving towards either Waynesboro or Staunton and that Jackson might attack Milroy. Frémont voiced Banks' concerns to Milroy on the fourth, but Milroy was skeptical that Jackson would attack with Banks' army in his rear. If attacked, he planned to call on Brig. Gen. Robert C. Schenck's brigade located at Franklin.[27]

First contact between the two forces occurred on the afternoon of 7 May, when Milroy's artillery shelled Johnson's lead brigade as it marched along the Chambersburg-Parkersburg turnpike. Milroy pulled his forces back to McDowell and wired for help.[28]

Schenck, receiving the call, marched his brigade an incredible thirty-four miles in twenty-three hours, arriving at McDowell by 1000 hours on the eighth. As the senior of the two generals, Schenck assumed command. It was obvious to the Union generals that an attack was coming, and it was just as clear that their small force could not stop it; so, rather than waiting for the Confederates to attack, Schenck gained tactical surprise by striking first.

The outcome was never in question because of the disparity in numbers—2,268 Federal troops to 6,000 Confederate—but the Union attack so disorganized the Confederates that Schenck's and Milroy's forces were able to break away and march unhampered back toward Franklin. Although the Confederates had been on the defensive, their casualties were higher—498 versus 256 for the Union. Nevertheless, with the Federal forces in retreat, Jackson wired the Confederate high command that "God blessed our arms with victory."[29]

Jackson's troops pursued the soldiers of Milroy and Schenck north toward Franklin, with the Confederates marching through woods set ablaze by the retreating Federal troops. Jackson sent his topographer, Jedediah Hotchkiss, and a troop of cavalry to search for a way through the Alleghenies and to block the mountain roads between Franklin and Staunton. He wanted to find a route that would allow his army to get behind Banks' army and to prevent Banks from uniting with Frémont.

Jackson's troops were arrayed outside Franklin by 10 May. Schenck expected their attack on the eleventh, but it did not come. Federal forces continued to arrive, and by 12 May there were 15,000 Union soldiers in Franklin, almost double the number in Jackson's besieging force.[30]

Jackson received two messages on 12 May that hastened his army's return to the valley. The first, from Johnston through Lee, instructed him to return to the valley and attack Banks if possible. The second message, from Ewell, informed him that Shields was marching east to join General McDowell's corps at Catlett's Station southwest of Manassas. That afternoon, the Valley Army began marching back towards the hamlet of McDowell. Before his departure, Jackson wrote Ewell that he believed Banks would unite with General Frémont rather than with General McDowell, but as a contingency Jackson instructed Ewell to follow Banks if the Federals did pull back.[31]

Frémont's adjutant notified the War Department on 13 May that Jackson was on his way back into the valley. The Valley Army arrived in McDowell on the fourteenth and continued its march toward Staunton.[32]

Meanwhile, Banks, attempting to carry out Secretary Stanton's order of 1 May, was pulling back as slowly as he had moved forward. His soldiers did not like withdrawing. Some felt that because of their reduced numbers they were acting as decoys to trap the Confederate forces. General Williams wrote his daughter about his chagrin over "marching back, like a retreating force, over the same ground that we had driven the Rebels before us, and . . . that without a gun being fired or a man killed."[33]

It appears that Secretary Stanton became concerned about leaving Banks exposed well up the Shenandoah Valley the day after he informed Banks of

Shields' departure. He instructed Shields on 2 May not to join McDowell until Banks was in position at Strasburg, but he gave no additional guidance on how to implement his instructions. Banks and Shields were both confused about who was to pull back first. With the Union forces arrayed along the valley turnpike from Harrisonburg north to Strasburg, Banks warned Stanton that too much distance between the withdrawing forces might bring defeat in detail. Despite this confusion, all Federal soldiers were out of Harrisonburg and consolidated at New Market by 5 May.[34]

On 6 May, while his troops rested, Banks wired Secretary Stanton to ask which of the two forces, his or Shields', would pull back first to Strasburg. He received no answer, but the War Department did notify General McDowell to prepare to move toward Richmond. McDowell then sent two telegrams, the first to the War Department, asking where Shields was, and the second to Shields, telling him to speed up his march. Again, there was no answer from the War Department. Banks wired Stanton again on the seventh, informing him his division was ready to move. Stanton did not answer any of these messages because he had gone to Fort Monroe with President Lincoln.[35]

The president and his secretary of war had taken personal charge of the military departments around Washington in March. Now, when the two leaders visited General McClellan on the peninsula, they forgot those departments. For six days, from 2 to 8 May, Stanton sent no messages to Federal commanders in the valley. On 8 May Stanton passed to Banks and McDowell a peninsula rumor that the Confederates were sending a large force toward the Rappahannock and Shenandoah Rivers to attack Washington. This message worried McDowell, who, believing the enemy was massing in front of him, again wired Shields to move his division quickly.[36]

Stanton sent a flurry of messages on the ninth, after he had returned to Washington and realized that Banks and Shields were in almost the same positions in which he had left them on the second. He ordered Banks to release Shields to McDowell and to draw back his own forces to Strasburg immediately. In response to Stanton's telegram, Frémont wired that the withdrawal of Banks had allowed Jackson to concentrate against him. Banks agreed and pointed out that Jackson now would concentrate against any small force in the valley. In a letter to his cavalry commander, Brig. Gen. John Geary, who was also being assigned to McDowell, Banks complained that the government's policy was allowing the "grand army of the rebels" to escape and adding another year to the war.

By 13 May Banks' main column was in Strasburg and Shields' division was near Front Royal, preparing to board trains for McDowell's corps. With Shields gone, Banks had less than 9,000 troops in the valley; of these 7,000 were in Strasburg, another 1,000 were at Front Royal, and scattered detachments were stationed along the Manassas Gap Railroad.[37]

During the time Banks' forces were pulling back to Strasburg, General Ewell continued to receive suggestions from Lee and instructions from Jackson. On 8 May, as the pressure mounted on Fredericksburg, Lee informed Ewell that he saw no reason for his division to remain so far west and suggested he move it either to Gordonsville or to the Rappahannock. Ewell wired back that he was under orders from Jackson not to leave the valley unless Banks did.[38]

One of the messages from Ewell or Jackson must have reached General Johnston, who now learned what was going on with his outlying detachments. Wiring Lee on the eighth, Johnston complained that he controlled only those parts of his command that were nearby. He protested that he did not have any means of receiving information from the other commanders in his department and that Lee had provided him with none. Lee rather disingenuously answered that Johnston had not asked that information be forwarded to him. Johnston then wired Lee that he was either in command of the far-flung elements or he should be relieved of their responsibility.[39]

As the historian Douglas S. Freeman has observed, the Confederate leaders were working at cross purposes. Both Johnston and Lee had as their ultimate objective the defense of Richmond, but the two generals were trying to use the same resources to achieve different intermediate goals. Johnston wanted concentration at Richmond, meeting mass with mass, while Lee was focusing on how to keep the Union forces at Fredericksburg from uniting with McClellan. His messages to Ewell and Brig. Gen. Joseph Anderson, who in late April had superseded Field in command of the Confederate forces south of Fredericksburg, show that he had almost abandoned the strategic option of

Jackson and Ewell concentrating against Banks and now looked at a more workable arrangement. When Jackson left the valley in pursuit of Frémont, Lee felt Ewell would be more useful supporting Anderson and Field, thus demonstrating that the bond between Lee and Jackson was not so strong as to deter Lee from pursuing his own solutions to the dilemma facing the Confederates near Fredericksburg. As the pressure on Fredericksburg mounted, Lee urged Anderson to mount an attack against the Union forces gathering there.[40]

On 13 May, after a three-week lapse in his correspondence with Jackson and Ewell, General Johnston notified Ewell that he had recalled Jackson to the valley and wanted the two forces to unite and attack Banks if possible. In the event Banks moved east to support McDowell, Ewell was instructed to leave Jackson, march east, and unite with either the Confederate army on the peninsula or General Anderson at Fredericksburg.[41]

It is commonly assumed that prior to 20 May Jackson planned to attack Banks through the eastern valley. His messages to Ewell, however, indicate otherwise. Jackson sent Ewell a message on 17 May, telling him to have his division at New Market in the western valley by the twenty-first and to try to find a route over Massanutten Mountain from Luray to Edenburg. Jackson's first choice was an attack through the western valley, but he held open the option of attacking Banks through Front Royal. Ewell in turn forwarded Johnston's message of the thirteenth to Jackson. Since it appeared that Shields was leaving the valley to join McDowell and that Ewell was interpreting his instructions from Johnston to require him to march east in this situation, Jackson could see his plan of uniting with Ewell against Banks coming to naught. Jackson immediately wrote Johnston, explaining that Ewell's departure would upset his scheme to attack Banks and that he was continuing to pursue his plan, pending further word from Johnston.[42]

When Jackson met with Ewell at Mount Solon on 18 May, he had not yet received a reply from Johnston. Ewell was in a dilemma. He was under instructions from Johnston to march his division toward Gordonsville if Banks moved east, yet believed himself still under Jackson's command. Jackson wrote Ewell a letter stating that, as long as he was in the valley, he remained under his command and that, unless advised differently, Ewell was to obey Jackson's orders. The command problem thus solved, the generals sat down and planned the next phase.

The Confederate generals saw the Union army split into four parts at the same time the Confederate forces were concentrating. Frémont's army was still at Franklin on the other side of the Allegheny Mountains. McDowell's command was at Fredricksburg, and Shields' division, released from the valley, was moving east to join him. Banks and his one remaining division were immediately to their front at Strasburg and Front Royal. Against any of these separate Federal detachments, Jackson and Ewell could engage 16,000 Confederate soldiers. Banks was their target. Jackson directed Ewell to bring his division north of New Market in the western valley by the night of 21 May.[43]

The Valley Army marched on 19 May, passing through Harrisonburg and stopping on the twentieth just short of New Market, where Brig. Gen. Richard Taylor's Louisiana Brigade, an element of Ewell's command, joined it. Jackson had ordered this brigade to join the Valley Army there. The Louisianians had been camped west of the Shenandoah River and south of Massanutten Mountain, several miles from Ewell's headquarters at Conrad's Store. Jackson now sent Ewell another message, changing his orders of the previous day. He instructed Ewell to move his contingent farther up the western valley and to establish camp north of Mount Jackson.[44]

Ewell halted his march at Luray on 19 May after receiving a new telegram from Johnston that told him that an attack against an entrenched Banks was too risky and that instead ordered his division to move east while Jackson would stay merely to observe Banks. Taylor, now separated from Ewell, did not receive the message to move east. Johnston's message was dated 17 May, the day before Ewell's meeting with Jackson. Seeing no option but to obey Johnston's orders, Ewell forwarded the message to Jackson and prepared to move east. When informed of the telegram, Jackson again saw his attack plan thwarted. This time, rather than again appealing to Johnston, he wired General Lee: "I am of [the] opinion that an attempt should be made to defeat Banks, but under instructions just received from General Johnston I do not feel at liberty to make an attack. Please answer by telegraph at once."[45]

Lee did not respond. General Johnston had sent two messages to Jackson on 18 May, both addressing Jackson's telegram of the seventeenth and advocating that Jackson attack Banks if possible. The messages further defined the Valley Army's mission to keep Banks from joining General McDowell. One or both messages may have passed through Lee's office. Jackson received both the night of the twentieth.[46]

Capt. John Imboden was at the telegraph station when the first message came in. He described the message in substance as follows, "If you think you can beat Banks, attack him. I only intended by my orders to caution you against attacking fortifications."[47]

The Valley Army continued its march down the valley on 21 May. Johnston's warning against attacking Banks in entrenchments and his hope that the Valley Army could keep Banks from reinforcing McDowell forced Jackson to reconsider his plans. Now, instead of marching from Harrisonburg through New Market to Strasburg as planned, the army turned right at New Market and headed across the Massanutten to Luray. Jackson decided to move down the eastern valley to Front Royal only after Johnston had warned him not to attack Banks in his entrenchments. Jackson overrode his initial judgment when he attacked through the eastern valley, as he understood full well the risks involved in attacking across a river, but he also knew that even if his attack did not succeed, this move would keep Banks away from McDowell by severing the Manassas Gap Railroad.

At Luray, the remainder of Ewell's Division joined the Valley Army, bringing its strength to more than 16,000 men and 40 cannon. The march continued north, and by the afternoon of 22 May the Valley Army was just ten miles south of Front Royal, a town held by only 1,000 Federal troops.[48]

Banks knew that Jackson was coming; although he did not know when, he believed he knew where. In messages to Stanton, Banks predicted that Jackson would come down the valley west of Massanutten Mountain. Banks realized that since he had pulled back from New Market the way was open for Jackson to consolidate with Ewell, and he warned Stanton that the disparity in strength between his force and Jackson's combined army invited a Confederate offensive against Strasburg. Before the attack on Front Royal he wrote, "I regard it as certain that [Jackson] will move north as far as New Market, a position which commands the mountain gap and the roads into the Department of the Rappahannock, and enables him also to cooperate with General Ewell." Far from being a bumbler as he was frequently portrayed, Banks realized that he was in trouble, but he could not get Washington to understand his predicament.[49]

The Valley Army began its final march before battle in the early morning of the twenty-third with Ewell's division leading. While the infantry marched, Jackson's cavalry struck Buckton Station, between Front Royal and Strasburg, and the Manassas Gap Railroad west of Front Royal; this cut off the Front Royal garrison from the Federal forces at Strasburg and Winchester.

Col. John Kenly, the Federal commander at Front Royal, counted 1,000 soldiers of his 1st Maryland Volunteer Infantry Regiment (U.S.) in his garrison. Upon identifying the defenders as Marylanders, Jackson ordered his own newly formed 1st Maryland Infantry (C.S.) to attack. The fight on the east side of the Shenandoah was short—hopelessly outnumbered, Kenly withdrew his regiment over the bridges crossing the South Fork of the Shenandoah River. As Kenly's men pulled back, they set both the North and South Fork bridges on fire, hoping to prevent the pursuing Confederates from crossing. The lead Confederate brigade, however, rushed through the burning embers and began putting out the fires, while the Confederate cavalry, along with Jackson and his staff, continued the attack.

When the Federal troops began forming another line of battle on the hill west of Front Royal, Jackson ordered Col. Thomas Flourney's cavalry to attack the Union troops. There were four times as many Federal infantry as there were Confederate cavalry, but the mass and speed of the attack shattered the Union line and resulted in a total rout. The final casualty figure for Kenly's regiment was 32 killed, 122 wounded, and 750 captured, while Confederate casualties were less than 100. About 90 Union soldiers made it back to Banks' lines at Strasburg.[50] With the capture of Front Royal, Banks' force had shrunk to 6,000, just one-third the size of Jackson's Valley Army.

Initially, General Banks disbelieved the eyewitness reports on Confederate strength. As more survivors of the Front Royal garrison made it back to the

*General Banks*

entrenchments at Strasburg and told their stories, however, Banks concluded that Ewell was on his left flank and Jackson to his front.[51]

There was little time for Banks to ponder his next move before he would be faced with a much larger Confederate army between him and his base at Winchester. Banks saw that he had three choices: stay in Strasburg and possibly have his entire army captured; retreat along the Strasburg-Moorefield Road and seek refuge with Frémont; or retreat the eighteen miles to Winchester with his flanks exposed to an attack by Ewell. Banks quickly discarded the first option, recognizing that he could not hold Strasburg against the combined force of Jackson and Ewell. Banks' second choice was probably the safest alternative for his combat units, but it would have left his wagon trains at Strasburg and the supplies at Winchester open to capture. He chose to retreat to Winchester and notified his commanders on the night of the twenty-third to prepare to pull back. Less than six hours later, at 0300, a twelve-mile-long column of Union wagons began to roll down the turnpike.[52]

On the morning of 24 May Jackson, unsure of Banks' intentions, began probing the Union positions east of Strasburg with General Taylor's Louisiana Brigade and Col. Turner Ashby's cavalry regiment. The Union main body had cleared Middletown when the Confederates made contact with Banks' rear guard. Jackson believed for a time that he had intercepted Banks' main body and sent a message to Ewell telling him not to move closer to Winchester. When Jackson learned that the Federals engaging him were the rear guard, he sent a hurried message to Ewell, ordering him to move on Winchester in the hope that he might cut Banks off. The running battle between Taylor's brigade and the Union rear guard on the valley turnpike continued to Newtown and beyond before Banks' column was able to break contact with the Confederates. By nightfall, Banks' command was concentrated on the hills south of Winchester.[53]

General Jackson pushed his troops towards Winchester through the night and by daybreak on 25 May had his army of 15,000 weary soldiers facing General Banks' equally exhausted 6,000. The battle began as the sun broke through the morning fog, but it did not develop as Jackson expected. The Stonewall Brigade, under Brig. Gen. Charles Winder, made the initial attack, driving Banks' men from a prominent hill on left flank of the Union defenses; then with the sound of cannon echoing through the fog, General Ewell launched the brigades of Brig. Gen. Isaac Trimble and Col. John Campbell at the Union center. When this attack stalled, Jackson sent the Louisiana Brigade into the attack on the Federals' far right flank. With pressure coming from three sides, the Northern line collapsed. Banks' troops broke away from the assaulting Confederate infantry and raced north through Winchester toward Maryland. Jackson's exhausted men could not keep pace, and the Federals pulled away from the Valley Army virtually unmolested. At Winchester, unlike Front Royal, Jackson's cavalry was not available when needed, and the pursuit was attempted only by a few infantrymen mounted on artillery horses. During the course of 25 May 1862, Banks and his troops retreated over thirty miles to Williamsport, Maryland.[54]

On 24 May, after learning of Jackson's attack on

Front Royal, President Lincoln expressed concern about Jackson's rampage in the valley and worried about the Army of the Potomac's isolation from Washington. He sent telegrams to Generals Frémont and McDowell, putting into motion a plan to capture the Valley Army. Lincoln ordered Frémont to enter the valley by way of Harrisonburg and attack Jackson. The telegram to McDowell canceled his march on Richmond and instructed him to send 20,000 soldiers into the Shenandoah Valley to capture Jackson and Ewell. Lincoln told McDowell to try to coordinate his movements with Frémont, although he believed McDowell had enough soldiers to defeat Jackson by himself.[55]

At 1700 hours on 24 May 1862, the day before the battle at Winchester, General Jackson had won the Valley campaign. President Lincoln's perception of Jackson's threat to Washington was such that, rather than allow McDowell to continue his march south towards Richmond and the potentially war-ending struggle being waged there, the president directed him west into the valley to pursue a subsidiary campaign against Jackson. Later on the night of 24 May McDowell wired President Lincoln in dismay, arguing that Jackson would be gone by the time his soldiers got to the valley. McDowell concluded, "I shall gain nothing for you there, and shall lose much for you here." McDowell told Brig. Gen. James Wadsworth, the commander of the Washington garrison: "If the enemy army can succeed so readily in disconcerting all our plans by alarming us first at one point, then at another, he will paralyze a large force with a very small one." Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase, who was with McDowell's army at Falmouth, also questioned the move, suggesting it would be better for McDowell to isolate Jackson from Richmond by capturing Charlottesville.[56] Twenty-five May ended with Jackson and his troops resting at Winchester, Banks' soldiers crossing the Potomac at Williamsport, and Frémont and McDowell's forces preparing to move their commands into the Shenandoah Valley to confront Jackson.

**Conclusion**

The Valley campaign proved eminently successful to the Confederate cause on both the strategic and operational levels. Jackson's efforts not only successfully engaged all the Federal forces in the valley but also diverted substantial potential reinforcements from



*President Lincoln*

General McClellan. When the time came to fight the battles around Richmond, the Union superiority in manpower was 105,000 to 78,000 (or roughly 4:3), rather than the 137,000 to 68,000 (or roughly 2:1) disparity the Confederates might have faced.[57]

The campaign in the valley was not a matter of two generals fighting one another without direction from higher command. The following sequence of decisions made by leaders outside the valley decisively influenced the events that transpired there:

1) Secretary Stanton's message of 25 April stopped General Banks from occupying Staunton. Had Banks continued to Staunton, Confederate General Edward Johnson would have had to withdraw from the mountain passes or be crushed between Generals Banks and Frémont.

2) Stanton's orders of 1 and 8 May forced General Banks to send General Shields' division to General McDowell's command. Without the diversion of Shields, Banks probably would have had sufficient men to handle the forces of Jackson and Ewell combined.

3) A later message from Stanton called on Banks to pull back to Strasburg. Had Banks remained at the strategic town of New Market, Jackson could not as easily have united with Ewell for an attack on Banks.

4) General Lee proposed on 5 May that General Ewell join with Generals Field and Anderson at Fredericksburg. Had Ewell acquiesced, Jackson would not have had enough manpower to attack Banks. Lee, however, was looking for a diversion to keep McDowell away from Richmond, and he did not care from whence it came.

5) Johnston instructed Jackson not to assault Banks in his entrenchments at Strasburg. Had Jackson continued up the western valley, he might have been unable to carry a frontal attack against Banks. Instead, Jackson detoured east of Massanutten Mountain, accepting the risk that the garrison at Front Royal might burn the bridges over the Shenandoah River before the Valley Army crossed. Even had he failed to cross the Shenandoah, however, Jackson would have successfully accomplished his mission by cutting the railroad between Banks and McDowell.

6) Nevertheless, *all the above would have been moot had President Lincoln not issued instructions sending McDowell into the valley after Jackson.* The true significance of the campaign lay in this diversion of McDowell's corps into the valley and away from a linkup with McClellan outside Richmond. On 23 May the immediate military outlook for the Confederacy appeared dire. General McClellan's troops could see the church spires of Richmond, and General McDowell's corps was pressing south from Fredericksburg. To prevent the two Union armies from uniting, General Johnston was preparing to launch a desperate attack across Chicahominy Creek against McClellan's entrenched right wing. Only the realization that McDowell had reversed his march halted the Confederate assault and its almost certain defeat.[58]

General Banks' comments made before the engagement at Front Royal that Lincoln and Stanton's actions in the valley went far towards prolonging the life of the Confederacy are justified. The history of the United States would be dramatically different had the Civil War ended in 1862.

*Retired Command Sgt. Maj. Robert S. Rush served in ranger, light, and mechanized infantry units and at every organizational level from squad to army. While assigned to the Center of Military History in 1995–1996, he provided historical assistance to the Secretary of the Army's Task Force on Extremism, and he subsequently assisted the Advisory Panel on Sexual Harassment. Currently a Ph.D. candidate in military history at Ohio State University, he has been awarded a CMH dissertation year fellowship.*

NOTES

1. U.S. War Department, *War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, 128 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1880–1901), ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, p. 107; pt. 1, p. 523 (hereafter cited as *OR* with series and volume numbers).

2. Joseph E. Johnston, *Narrative of Military Operations, Directed, During the Late War Between the States, by Joseph E. Johnston, General, C.S.A.* (1874; reprint ed., Bloomington, Ind., 1959), pp. 106, 131; Vincent J. Esposito, ed., *West Point Atlas of American Wars*, 2 vols. (New York, 1959), vol. 1, map 50. The Union forces counted in the above tally consist of McClellan's army (105,000) plus Maj. Gen. Irwin McDowell's corps (30,000), without the addition of Shields' division. Confederate forces include the 60,000 troops of the Confederate Army in and around Richmond.

3. Douglas Southall Freeman, *R. E. Lee: A Biography*, 4 vols. (New York, 1934–35), 2: 32; *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, pp. 39, 66.

4. Esposito, *Atlas of American Wars*, vol. 1, map 50; James S. Pula, *The History of a German-Polish Civil War Brigade* (San Francisco, 1976), p. 10.

5. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 1, pp. 164–65; 234–35; pt. 3, pp. 15–16, 27.

6. Ibid., ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 1, pp. 94–95.

7. Ibid., ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 1, p. 7; pt. 3, p. 104.

8. Esposito, *Atlas of American Wars*, vol. 1, map 50; *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 5, p. 1099; Johnston, *Narrative of Military Operations*, pp. xvii, 74; Freeman, *R. E. Lee*, 2: 32.

9. Johnston, *Narrative of Military Operations*, pp. 106, 110; Douglas Southall Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command*, 3 vols. (New York, 1942–44), 1: 336; *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 11, pt. 3, p. 458.

10. Clifford Dowdey, ed., *The Wartime Papers of R. E. Lee* (Boston, 1961), p. 174; *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, pp. 111–12, 118–19, 859–60.

11. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, pp. 862–63.

12. Dowdey, *Papers of Lee*, pp. 155–57; *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, pp. 865–66, with the quotations on p. 866.
13. Dowdey, *Papers of Lee*, pp. 155–58. Between 21 and 25 April Lee sent three messages to Johnston, none commenting on either Jackson or Ewell.
14. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, pp. 105–07, with the quotation on p. 105.
15. Ibid., pp. 106–07, 110, 119.
16. Ibid., pp. 111–12, 118–19.
17. Ibid., pp. 50, 122.
18. Ibid., pp. 869–70.
19. Ibid., pp. 870–71; Dowdey, *Papers of Lee*, pp. 160–61.
20. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, p. 872.
21. Ibid., p. 876.
22. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, p. 878.
23. Jedediah Hotchkiss, *Make Me a Map of the Valley: The Civil War Journal of Stonewall Jackson's Topographer* (Dallas, 1973), pp. 34–35.
24. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, pp. 878–79; William Allen, "Jackson's Valley campaign of 1862," *Southern Historical Society Papers* 7 (January 1879): 14–15; David G. Martin, *Jackson's Valley Campaign, November 1861–June 1862* (Bryn Mawr, Pa., 1988), pp. 61–62.
25. Robert L. Dabney, *Life and Campaigns of Lieut.-Gen. Thomas J. Jackson* (New York, 1866), pp. 338–39; Hotchkiss, *Map of the Valley*, p. 36.
26. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, pp. 881–82; pt. 1, pp. 470–71.
27. Ibid., ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, pp. 126, 133, 137.
28. Ibid., ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 1, p. 465; pt. 3, p. 141.
29. Ibid., ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, pp. 141, 146; Dabney, *Campaigns of Jackson*, p. 350; *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 1, pp. 470–76, with the quotation on p. 470.
30. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 1, p. 473; pt. 3, pp. 173, 181, 184; Dabney, *Campaigns of Jackson*, pp. 352–53; Hotchkiss, *Map of the Valley*, pp. 43–45.
31. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 1, p. 473; pt. 3, pp. 888–89; Dabney, *Campaigns of Jackson*, pp. 352–53.
32. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, p. 184; Hotchkiss, *Map of the Valley*, p. 45.
33. Milo M. Quaife, ed., *From the Cannon's Mouth: The Civil War Letters of General Alpheus S. Williams* (Detroit, 1959), pp. 73–74, with the quotation on p. 74.
34. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, pp. 125, 129, 135.
35. Ibid., pp. 136–38, 140, 884–85.
36. Ibid., pp. 142, 144.
37. Ibid., ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 1, pp. 523–24; pt. 3, pp. 154–55, with the quoted words on p. 154.
38. Ibid., ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, pp. 884–85.
39. Ibid., ser. 1, vol. 11, pt. 3, pp. 499–500, 506, 510.
40. Freeman, *R. E. Lee*, 2: 34; *OR*, ser 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, pp. 867, 881, 883–84, 885–86, 896–97.
41. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, p. 888.
42. G. F. R. Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War*, 2 vols. (New York, 1898), 1: 236; Douglas Southall Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command*, 3 vols. (New York, 1944), 1: 366; Robert G. Tanner, *Stonewall in the Valley: Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson's Shenandoah Valley Campaign, Spring 1862* (Garden City, N.Y., 1976), p. 198; Frank E. Vandiver, *Mighty Stonewall* (1957, reprint ed., College Station, Tex., 1992), pp. 237–38; Joseph T. Glatthaar, *Partners in Command: The Relationships Between Leaders in the Civil War* (New York, 1994), p. 25; *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, pp. 894–95.
43. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, p. 897. The books cited in note 42 either leave out Jackson's instructions to Ewell or do not explain why Jackson, in a face-to-face conversation with Ewell, ordered Ewell to move his division west of Massanutten Mountain. The strengths of the Union detachments were Frémont with 15,000; McDowell with 30,000; Shields with 11,000; and Banks 8,000.
44. Richard Taylor, *Destruction and Reconstruction: Personal Experiences of the Late War* (New York, 1879), p. 48; Hotchkiss, *Map of the Valley*, p. 46; Dabney, *Campaigns of Jackson*, pp. 359–60; *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, p. 898.
45. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, pp. 896–98, with the quotation on p. 898.
46. Hotchkiss, *Map of the Valley*, pp. 46-47; Tanner, *Stonewall*, pp. 201–02.
47. John Imboden, "Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley," in Robert U. Johnson and C. C. Buel, eds., *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, 4 vols. (1884–1888, reprint ed., New York, 1956), 2: 288.
48. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 1, pp. 536–37, 555–58, 702–03, 733–34; Richard Taylor, *Destruction and Reconstruction*, pp. 50–51; Dabney, *Campaigns of Jackson*, pp. 364–68.
49. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 1, pp. 524–27, with the quotation on p. 524; Fred H. Harrington, *Fighting Politician: Major General N. P. Banks* (Philadelphia,

1948), castigates Banks for being an unskilled political general and faults Banks for his role in the Valley campaign. Banks had served as Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives and governor of Massachusetts in the years prior to the war.

50. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 1, pp. 536–37, 555–58, 702–03, 733–34; Dabney, *Campaigns of Jackson*, pp. 365–68.

51. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 1, pp. 525–26.

52. Ibid., pp. 527–28, 546–47.

53. Ibid., ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 1, pp. 546–49, 614–16, 703–04; pt. 3, p. 899.

54. Ibid., ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 1, pp. 527, 549–52, 595–98, 616–18, 705–06, 736–37.

55. Ibid., ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, p. 219; pt. 1, p. 643.

56. Ibid., ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, pp. 220, 221, 229, with the quotations on pp. 220 and 221.

57. The first numbers represent McClellan's army (105,000) without McDowell's reinforcing corps (40,000) versus Johnston (Lee) (60,000) supplemented by Jackson and Ewell (18,000 together). The second set comprises McClellan plus McDowell (less Shields' division of 8,000) versus Johnston (Lee) plus Ewell (8,000), but without Jackson. See Esposito, *Atlas of American Wars*, maps 42 and 51.

58. Johnston, *Narrative of Military Operations*, p. 131; Gustavus W. Smith, *The Battle of Seven Pines* (New York, 1891), p. 14.

## Call for Papers: June 2000 Conference of Army Historians

The Center of Military History is soliciting papers for the June 2000 biennial Conference of Army Historians. The theme of the conference will be "The Korean War." Papers may address the background, conduct, or impact of the war. The conference organizers are seeking papers relating to all aspects of military operations in Korea, including the impact of military and civilian leaders, the contributions of various branches and organizations in the Army, the roles of other U.S. military services, and the operations of the military forces of other nations. Discussions of the diplomatic and political context of the war are also welcome. A secondary focus of the conference will be the Cold War, and the Center is particularly interested in papers addressing the impact of the Korean War on other facets of the Cold War.

The conference will be held on 6–8 June 2000 in metropolitan Washington, D.C. Prospective participants should send their proposed paper topics to by mail to Dr. William Stivers, U.S. Army Center of Military History, ATTN: DAMH-FPF, 103 Third Avenue, Fort Lesley J. McNair, D.C. 20319-5058 or by electronic mail to stivewa@hqda.army.mil. Further information may be obtained by calling Dr. Stivers at 202-685-2729.

## Center of Military History News

### CMH Provides Link to Revised Regulations

The "Books and Documents" section of the Center of Military History's web page, http: www.army.mil/cmh-pg, now provides convenient access to the three Army regulations for which the Center is the proponent. Two of these regulations, AR 870–5, *Military History: Responsibilities, Policies, and Procedures*, and AR 870–20, *Army Museums, Historical Artifacts, and Art*, appear in revised editions issued earlier this year. AR 220–5: *Designation, Classification, and Change in Status of Units*, was issued in 1991.

### CMH Seeks Volunteers

The U.S. Army Center of Military History is seeking volunteers interested in assisting with the work of the Center. Volunteers may participate in the preparation and organization of library and archival materials and in providing information to the public. The volunteer work will be conducted at the Center's primary location at 103 Third Avenue, Fort McNair, D.C. Nearby on-post parking is normally available. Interested individuals should provide a *vita*, together with their address and telephone number, to Dr. Jeffrey Clarke, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 103 Third Avenue, Fort McNair, D.C. 20319-5058. Further information may be obtained from Dr. Clarke at 202-685-2709.

# THE CHIEF'S CORNER
## John Sloan Brown

As I look back on the first half of 1999, it is my pleasure to report significant progress in implementing the Army Historical Program Strategic Plan 2010. As you know, the Strategic Plan features five major focus areas, and we are moving ahead nicely in all of them.

Our goal with respect to INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY is ultimately to provide on-demand interactive access to military history, artifact data, and source documentation. We are very proud of the progress we are making with our U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) website (*www.army.mil/cmh-pg*) and delighted by its receipt of the Academic Excellence Award from Studynet and similar compliments from Netscape. These kudos from educators attempting to exploit the internet indicate the appropriateness of our choice of medium—as does the fact we average over 300,000 "hits" a week. Not only do we have an ever-increasing array of publications posted, we also have Army art displayed and are introducing artifact information and virtual tours of museums—starting with Fort Myer. CMH and cyberspace mix well!!

With respect to PRODUCTS AND SERVICES, we want our customers to receive timely, accurate, and comprehensive historical information and services. We are proud of our recent publications and of the facility with which we have dispatched a spate of recent Congressional, Secretariat, and Army Staff inquiries, but we are looking to the future in refining a Historical Projects Development Process (HPDP) in which we will invite all of you to participate. I will have more to share with you concerning this exciting initiative in my next Chief's Corner.

OUTREACH is our goal in being proactive and responsive in rendering potential customers aware of historical products and services. Our new book release program is designed to energize the most appropriate audiences. For example, we issued *Industrialists in Olive Drab* with some fanfare in Atlanta at a conference of the National Defense Industrial Association; and LTG Larry Jordan, the Army's Inspector General, personally hosted a reception with all his key associates to release the latest volume of *The Inspectors General of the United States Army*. Our Dissertation Fellowship Program has identified more fine young scholars for substantial assistance, and we have energetically advertised our wares throughout the Army and beyond it as well. We are very much looking forward to the 6–9 June 2000 Conference of Army Historians—the theme will be the Korean War—and are casting the net widely for papers to support it.

Insofar as EDUCATION is concerned, we want the whole Army to think in a historical context. We will spend more time on this theme at our next meeting of the Military History Coordinating Committee in the fall. Here we might take special notice of the wonderful job so many Army museums have been doing in promoting heritage training on our posts. This timely educational effort is valuable in its own right and offers a useful complement to the Army's values training as well.

Effective PROGRAM MANAGEMENT would see all of us in the historical community routinely collaborate with, coordinate with, and support one another. I feel extremely positive concerning the teamwork we are seeing displayed across the entire Army Historical Program. Cases in point include the spirit of cooperation demonstrated in the recent meeting of the MACOM Historians' Council and the ringing endorsement we received for our Strategic Plan from the Secretary of the Army and his Senior Staff Council.

I hope you will find this progress report with respect to the Army Historical Program Strategic Plan 2010 helpful and encouraging. We very much look forward to hearing about the progress all of you are making with respect to your own areas of responsibility.

# MacArthur's Engineers:
## Engineer Mobilization During the First Philippine Campaign

By John W. Whitman

In late 1941 Lt. Gen. Douglas MacArthur's newly mobilized Philippine Army had serious engineer shortfalls. Since his arrival in the Philippines in 1935 as military adviser to the Commonwealth government, MacArthur had been building a national army to defend the islands upon their independence from the United States, scheduled for July 1946. The threatening international situation resulted in the mobilization of that army beginning in August 1941, and that mobilization was still incomplete four months later when Japan attacked.[1]

The first training for Filipino conscripts had begun early in 1937, after much hard work and preparation by MacArthur and his staff. Twenty thousand reservists were then called for five-and-a-half months' training. MacArthur was happy with the results and told a journalist that the military instruction had "gone exceedingly well." Yet the new army had serious shortages of nearly every type of equipment, multiple languages slowed training, and there were too few trained cadre to handle all the men. Money appropriated by the Philippine National Assembly for 1937 ran out, and funds from the next year's appropriations had to be used. Constant rains created poor living and training conditions. Annual training of as few as 5,000 men would prove a great drain on the Commonwealth's treasury, and funding more training was politically unpopular.[2]

The years leading up to 1941 barely improved the situation. New men received basic training each year, but MacArthur could do little in the area of field and weapons training. The U.S. Congress was loathe to fund these military activities, because the Philippines would soon be independent. Why waste the money? Filipino politicians were likewise unenthusiastic. The Philippine Army first attempted unit training in the summer of 1941, just before the prewar call-up of reserves, but even then it restricted that training to small units for a period of two weeks. The reservists drafted during the mobilization of late 1941 evidenced few if any of the benefits of premobilization training.[3]

Among the units of the Philippine Army activated in the fall of 1941 were division, corps, and army engineers designed to support a force that would ultimately include an army headquarters, three corps, and thirteen divisions. But the Army could count on few trained leaders, no soldiers trained as engineers, and very little engineering equipment. The few Philippine Army career soldiers were lost in a tidal wave of recruits.

In December 1941 there were only two trained Regular Army engineer battalions in the entire Philippine islands. One, the 803d Engineer Aviation Battalion, was engaged in airfield construction duties and could not spare men to train the Philippine Army's engineer recruits.[4] The other Regular Army engineer outfit was the 14th Engineer Battalion, an element of the Philippine Division. This battalion was officered by Americans and manned by career Filipino soldiers called Philippine Scouts. These enlisted men were fine soldiers who were equipped with the same individual gear standard to American units. The Philippine Scouts were known throughout the Army for their superb marksmanship and their love of soldiering.[5]

One officer from the 14th Engineer Battalion was assigned as an instructor to the engineer battalion of each of the Philippine Army's ten reserve divisions, and two Scout noncommissioned officers went to each company in these battalions. When the war began, these men were still training engineer cadre, and the Philippine Army's reserve engineer battalions had not yet started the standard thirteen weeks of basic engineer instruction. At that juncture, all the Americans could arrange for these units was a telescoped schedule of instruction in hand tools and pioneer equipment, hasty bridge construction, field fortifications, demolitions, and camouflage. As a result, the distribution of former officers and sergeants would prove critical to the Philippine Army's subsequent engineer operations.[6]

The most noteworthy characteristic of MacArthur's engineer force in December 1941 was its incomplete-

ness. Prewar plans had called for engineer mobilization to conclude in October 1942 with 500 trained officers and men in each Philippine Army divisional engineer battalion. However, as of 1 December 1941, not one battalion had been completely manned or equipped. Each battalion was staffed at about 80 percent strength, its members Filipino draftees with no military or engineering experience. About 16 officers and 375 enlisted men were assigned to each battalion, and all they had to work with were hand tools of the World War I period. They had no bulldozers, dump trucks, or power tools, and their transportation consisted of commandeered civilian buses.[7]

Battalion commanders discovered that they had many Filipino sergeants, "veterans" of earlier annual training, who could neither read nor write. Conversely, they had physicians, lawyers, dentists, and Philippine ROTC graduates serving as privates. Their requests to change the assignment of these highly skilled men went unanswered. The Philippine Army's engineer officers were reservists who had received five-and-a-half months' training between 1936 and 1939 but had never had a chance to apply their skills. Most had forgotten whatever they had once learned about how to train men.[8]

In addition to the combat engineer battalion authorized each of the Philippine Army's eleven divisions—the 1st regular division and the 11th, 21st, 31st, 41st, 51st, 61st, 71st, 81st, 91st, and 101st reserve divisions—the Philippine Army's engineer master plan called for 3 combat engineer regiments, 6 separate battalions, 2 heavy ponton battalions, and 3 topographic companies. Support echelons such as engineer parts companies and engineer equipment companies were also needed. These nondivisional units never saw the light of day.[9]

Although directed not to waste time building training areas and base camps, commanders had to spend days simply arranging for sanitation and clearing a space to live in the cluttered cantonments. Divisional engineers worked all day to build barracks, roads, and water systems and had only one hour at reveille and one hour at retreat for basic training. Even moving into completed buildings proved difficult. The 71st Division, for instance, first had to clean up after contract laborers who had lived in the barracks during their construction with their families, chickens, and pigs.[10]

Rains from June through November delayed cantonment construction. Storms washed out bridges, flooded foundations, and rotted everything. Typhoons washed away roads, knocked down buildings, and wrecked telephone and telegraph lines. Engineers hauled in thousands of cubic yards of crushed rock to surface roads, but under the punishment of ten-wheel ammunition trucks, every trace of hard surfacing soon sank into a sea of mud. Engineer battalions, which should have been training, spent much of their time building roads.[11]

Lacking military barrier supplies, engineers confiscated barbed wire from merchants. Filipino civilians willingly turned over what they had and helped the soldiers search for more. Mayors organized their townsmen, who stripped barbed wire from fences. Men collected wood from lumber yards and felled coconut trees. Civilians hauled in large quantities of bamboo to be used as pickets for the barbed wire and as sharpened stakes for obstacles.[12]

Building airfields turned out to be a bigger job than anyone expected. Construction and upgrade work was undertaken at over forty fields, but the effort soon lagged. There were simply not enough military engineer personnel nor sufficient competent civilian engineers and local contractors. Most of Luzon's civilian contractors and their equipment were already committed to Navy projects. Where personnel existed to do the work, a shortage of heavy construction equipment frustrated planners.[13]

Help came on 23 October 1941, when the 850-man 803d Engineer Aviation Battalion, together with its big tractors, rollers, and graders, arrived in the Philippines from the United States. Company A of the battalion immediately went northwest of the bomber base at Clark Field to build an airstrip at O'Donnell. Company B went first to Clark Field and then south to Del Carmen to build a new pursuit strip.[14]

Stateside reinforcements were to have provided more of MacArthur's engineers. By mid-November the War Department had approved the transfer to the Philippines of 19,359 officers and men belonging to specialized units, including engineers, along with another 3,168 individual officers and enlisted specialists. One of the units being readied in the United States for deployment was the 47th Engineers, a general service regiment. It was organized principally as a hand labor outfit that would use machinery only to a moderate

extent. But that unit and others slated as corps engineers did not arrive. They stacked up on the west coast awaiting the allocation of inadequate shipping.[15]

When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and Clark Field, more than a million tons of materiel earmarked for MacArthur were backlogged in ports and depots awaiting space on seventy separate shipments, and the substantial equipment allotments for two engineer aviation battalions were on the high seas. MacArthur's chief engineer, Lt. Col. Hugh J. Casey, was so worried about delays in his requisitions for equipment and materiel that he got on the overseas telephone and called the Office of the Chief of Engineers. In the clear rather than in code, he listed many of his most critical items. Casey stressed the urgency of the situation and pressed to have everything pushed forward as fast as possible.[16]

In North Luzon Force—soon to become I Philippine Corps on Bataan—the lack of trained engineers represented one of Maj. Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright's most grievous shortages. He needed staff officers to determine whether heavy timbers could be located for bridge repair and how they could be concentrated near bridges. What road construction equipment was available, and could the district engineers of the Philippine Bureau of Public Works provide it? Where were there stocks of gravel, sand, and stone for road repair and for the maintenance of highways and airfields? Where could he obtain bulk sources of water, and how would the water be managed? Were there sawmills and forest areas that could be used? Where could civilian workers be found? How could they be controlled? How would they be paid and fed? What stocks of hand tools existed in the civilian community, particularly among miners? Who would patrol the roads and bridges to report breaks or obstructions? Once someone answered these questions, Wainwright would need trained engineers to execute his various projects.[17]

Wainwright cast a longing eye at the Regular Army 14th Engineer Battalion, but that battalion was not under his control and, as mentioned, it had already been stripped for cadre. Once the Japanese landed, Wainwright would have to borrow engineers from his Philippine Army divisions to perform traditional corps engineer missions, obviously to the detriment of the affected divisions.[18]

Wainwright put his chief engineer to work. Lt. Col. Harry A. Skerry ordered the stocking of an army engineer depot and an advance army engineer depot. Skerry asked three of Luzon's chief mining firms—Benguet Consolidated, Big Wedge, and Atok—to ship to the two depots 180 tons of dynamite with caps and fuses. The mining companies responded immediately, using 100 civilian vehicles to deliver the explosives. Several months earlier, the engineers had reconnoitered Luzon, looking for explosives and fortification material. They had surveyed timber stocks and sawmills to determine how quickly material could be delivered for temporary bridges. Thus, Skerry had some idea about what existed and where he could find it.[19]

MacArthur's headquarters, meanwhile, attempted to collect men to serve as leaders of army-level engineers. Colonel Casey had the job of supporting the three corps with whatever army-level assets he could invent. Civilians in the Bureau of Public Works undertook many military roles as corps and army engineers. At least 2,000 civilian district engineer employees worked with Wainwright's North Luzon Force, another 2,000 supported Brig. Gen. George M. Parker's South Luzon Force, and an equal number assisted army engineers.[20]

Casey appealed to civilian engineers to help defend Luzon. The gold and copper mines in north Luzon were flush with miners from Arizona, California, Colorado, and South America. Many of these miners volunteered. A representative of a large explosives company, visiting from the United States, became a member of Casey's staff. Some engineers brought their civilian crews, equipment, and dynamite with them. These civilians were eminently qualified to perform all types of engineer work, even if they knew nothing about the military. They were comfortable working with a native labor force under primitive conditions, executing crude engineer work, yet getting the job done.[21]

The military commissioned these men in an effort to protect them under the laws of war. Since it was impossible to obtain War Department approval of these commissions, Casey threw out the rules and commissioned the men on the spot. Veteran civilian engineers in their mid- to late-twenties became second lieutenants, those in their early thirties pinned on first lieutenant bars, and older men up to age forty became

captains. Only a few specially qualified key personnel became majors. Men who had been working for the Philippine Department Engineer or the Constructing Quartermaster continued their work as civilians.[22]

Veteran civilian employees continued to focus on familiar tasks such as demolition and road maintenance and repair. They were especially useful for destroying bridges during the retreat from Lingayen Gulf. All these men were splendid technicians, but they knew little of the military. Some were overly familiar with their men and lost their respect, while others were too distant and set themselves up as martinets.[23]

The major Japanese invasion at Lingayen Gulf on 22 December ended the mobilization effort. Whatever engineers were present at that moment deployed and fought. As time progressed, the engineers often had to fight as infantry. The campaigns on Luzon and the Bataan Peninsula highlighted the seriousness of the engineer shortfalls. Although the few trained men did a magnificent job, especially with demolitions, improvisation was a costly process. Engineer units had not been adequately equipped or trained, and they succeeded at supporting MacArthur's army in only the most rudimentary fashion.

The I and II Philippine Corps withdrew from their beach defenses and arrived on Bataan's main battle position. Little if any engineer work had been done to prepare this line for occupation. The Philippine divisions now had to do what they could with what they had. None of the 41st Division's infantrymen, for instance, had individual entrenching tools, and its engineer battalion had only fifty picks and shovels and a few axes. The infantry, who were equally untrained in infantry skills as were the engineers in their military specialty, dug in using bayonets, bolos, and meat can lids. The absence of trained engineer soldiers meant improperly laid lines, vulnerable defensive positions, and much wasted effort. The entire army lacked adequate amounts of barbed wire, burlap bags, axes, picks, bolos, and shovels, not to mention bulldozers and trucks. Construction equipment, cement, steel pipe, acetylene, and oxygen were also critically short.[24]

Again, virtually no preparatory engineer work had been done before the army withdrew in late January 1942 to its reserve battle position, halfway down the Bataan peninsula. Solid jungle welcomed I Corps units. Once the army settled into these positions, the 14th Engineer Battalion sent out training teams to give classes in field fortifications. Courses began for division engineers. Some Philippine Army division commanders did not know how to employ their engineers properly, and it was even tougher training them. Senior engineer officers made detailed inspections of lines and provided recommendations for improvements. More officers were stripped from the 14th Engineer Battalion and assigned to Philippine Army engineer battalions.[25]

While on Bataan, the Army created two "corps engineer battalions" from untrained, ragtag troops officered by recently commissioned American civilian mining engineers. The 201st and 202d Engineer Battalions spent their time building roads, trails, bridges, and dummy artillery positions and destroying unexploded ordnance. They had received but a single week of training on basic soldier skills and little if any instruction on engineering tasks, and thus could have been described more accurately as labor battalions than corps engineers.[26]

The lack of experienced engineers showed all across the line as few soldiers displayed any military appreciation of terrain. Foxholes had raw dirt piled in front of them. Soldiers dug trenches and foxholes too close to barbed wire, few infantrymen appreciated grazing fire, and men dug in atop ridges rather than along the military crest. Filipinos did develop field expedients to replace mines and scarce barbed wire, but they were just that, expedients. There simply had been too little time to properly organize, equip, and train.[27]

Regardless of all their problems, Filipino and American engineers accomplished enough during the withdrawal to Bataan to enable MacArthur's army to get there relatively intact. What they accomplished on Bataan, when combined with the surprisingly good fighting qualities of the infantry and artillery, was enough to keep the Japanese at bay for over ninety days. The engineers suffered as severely as did the frontline infantry. In the last week they routinely deployed as infantry, and they too were overwhelmed by the Japanese offensive. In the end the defeat on Bataan was the product of starvation and sickness. MacArthur's engineers did their best from the start to the bitter end.

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## NOTES

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## New Publications

The Center of Military History has issued two new books. *Industrialists in Olive Drab: The Emergency Operation of Private Industries During World War II*, by John H. Ohly, edited by Clayton D. Laurie, is CMH Pub 70–32 (cloth) and 70–32–1 (paper). The cloth edition may be ordered from the Government Printing Office under stock number 008–029–00351–1 for $32; the paper edition is sold under stock number 008–029–0352–0 for $28.

The Center also published *The Inspectors General of the United States Army, 1903–1939*, by Joseph W. A. Whitehorne. This is a sequel to the volume *The Inspectors General of the United States Army, 1775–1903*, by David A. Clary and Joseph W. A. Whitehorne, issued in 1987. The new volume is listed as CMH Pub 70–68 (cloth) and 70–68–1 (paper). The cloth edition may be ordered from the Government Printing Office under stock number 008–029–00347–3 for $40; the paper edition is available under stock number 008–029–00348–1 for $32.

## Colonel Edgerton Assigned to CMH

Col. Daniel R. Edgerton has been assigned as deputy commander of the Center of Military History. An armor officer, Colonel Edgerton served as a special assistant to the U.S. ambassador for burden sharing in 1993–1997 and as chief of the Northeast Asia Policy Division, U.S. Pacific Command, in 1997–1999. Colonel Edgerton replaces Col. Stephen E. Wilson, who returned to a retired status.

**Book Review**
**by Richard W. Stewart**

***Giant of the Grand Siècle***
***The French Army, 1610–1715***
**by John A. Lynn**
**Cambridge University Press, 1997, 651 pp., $64.95.**

John Lynn has put together in one volume a fascinatingly complete picture of what he rightly terms the "giant" of the seventeenth century, the French Army. Just as the Spanish Army dominated much of the sixteenth century and the German Army much of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the French Army was the wonder of its age—much admired and often, although unsuccessfully, imitated. Lynn expertly tells the story of how what might be seen as the first truly "modern" army was raised, fed, clothed, housed, and led, and how its soldiers fought and died. Never content with merely listing victories or defeats (although these are surely the acid tests of any military structure), Professor Lynn unveils a multitude of new facts, new approaches, and new ideas. He grabs a much-believed myth or comfortable concept, shakes it hard, and subjects it under pressure to perceptive nuances of fact that change much of what we know about an often-overlooked army. While the army of Napoleon has had mountains of books (both good and bad) written about it and its ultimately unsuccessful commander, the astoundingly successful army of Louis XIV, the most commanding prince of his age, has been too often overlooked or misunderstood. John Lynn does much to redress this injustice.

This massive case study of an army contributes a great deal of detail and substance to the often vague and over-bold analyses of seventeenth century armies made by those who argue for and against the concept of a "military revolution" in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This revolution has in general, I believe, stood the test of time, but scholars should always be examining new facts and unexplored aspects of actual armies and bureaucracies to refine their understanding of how this concept is based in reality. If along the way the starting or ending years of the military revolution are altered, or the exact percentages of relative growth in the size of European armies in the seventeenth century are changed, the outlines of that revolution are still quite solid. States did create better armies in the seventeenth century. They were larger, better organized, and better led; they employed superior weaponry and tactics; and they could rely on a much more sophisticated logistical structure than armies of the previous century. A true revolution, not just merely a gradual evolution, occurred that moved European armies into a class of their own in terms of lethality and effectiveness. Those armies proceeded in the next two centuries to bring most of the rest of the world under the hegemony of a small hodgepodge of geographically minor, squabbling nation-states.

John Lynn has written an outstanding case study of the greatest army of its time, one that encapsulated most of the attributes of that early modern military revolution. He does not, however, simply use his evidence to buttress the main tenets of that revolution. He provides detailed commentary on the role of armies in state formation, recasts the argument over the growth of armies in the seventeenth century, and carefully examines the evolution, under the capable ministers of Louis XIV, of the army's supply and administrative systems, its command and control, its morale and motivation, and finally its employment on the battlefield.

Lynn had outlined much of his argument on the growth of the French Army in the seventeenth century in his article "Recalculating French Army Growth during the *Grand Siècle*, 1610–1715."[1] Here he refines and elucidates that argument by establishing a clear methodology and by grounding his interpretation on a reworked analysis of the "baseline" period of 1300–1610. Using careful building blocks of statistics and definitions, he cuts through the confusions of peacetime establishments versus wartime growth and of how to count militia and garrison troops as opposed to a mobile land force. To do so, he tackles the ever-vexing French financial records that often show the French royal establishment projecting one figure for the Army, paying for another number of soldiers, and actually fielding a wholly

different size force! Only a critical and exhaustive examination of such primary sources by one familiar with the context can produce any realistic numbers of army size, and thus army growth. Professor Lynn has done this with a result that will not soon be superseded, if at all.

In sum, Lynn presents as complete and careful an examination of the army of Louis XIV as he can, and the result is little short of definitive. He achieves his goal, which he states in the first paragraph, of painting a "portrait of that giant, the French army of the *grand siècle*," to make it "visible again." Like the French Army that it brings to life, this book will stand the test of time.

Every historian of the seventeenth century who attempts to understand the entirety of that turbulent time must have this book on his bookshelf or suffer the consequences of incomplete knowledge and a crippling blind spot. Every scholar of military history, even the worshipper of Napoleon, needs at least to borrow this book from the library (as it's size and Cambridge-cost make it hard to afford) and read it, if they are to understand their craft. The French Army was central to the evolution of the military in Europe, and the army of Louis XIV was at the core of that development.

**NOTES**

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**Book Review**
**by Stephen A. Bourque**

***Blundering to Glory***
***Napoleon's Military Campaigns***
**by Owen Connelly**
**Revised edition, SR Books, 1999, 254 pp.**
**cloth $55.00, paper $18.95.**

It is probably impossible to consider history's great military commanders without including Napoleon Bonaparte. From 1796 to 1815, Europe watched with a mixture of terror and awe as France exploded beyond the natural borders achieved during the Revolution. Bonaparte's troops, at a relatively dizzying pace, cut a swath of destruction from Lisbon to Moscow. Not until he proved unable to recover from the effects of his ill-conceived invasions of Spain and Russia were Europe's combined powers able to bring the Corsican upstart under control. Why was he so successful in most of his campaigns? Commentators from Jomini to Chandler have wrestled with this question. Was it luck? Was it simple genius? Was it a tribute to Bonaparte's energy and planning?

## Spanish-American War Art on Display

The Heritage Plantation of Cape Cod, located in Sandwich, Massachusetts, is hosting an exhibit of original watercolors, drawings, and chromolithographs of the Spanish-American War and the Cuban war of independence against Spain (1895–1898). On display are works of some two dozen American and British artists, including Walter Granville-Smith, Charles Johnson Post, Frederic Remington, and Thure de Thulstrup. Many of the exhibited pieces were reproduced in contemporary books, magazines, and newspapers. Depicted are scenes of combat, ceremony, and suffering in Cuba and the Philippines. The art will remain on display through October 24.

Stackpole Books has issued an exhibit catalog authored by Peter Harrington and Frederic A. Sharf, *"A Splendid Little War," The Spanish-American War, 1898: The Artists' Perspective.* It is priced at $17.95.

From Professor Connelly's perspective, he certainly did not have any specific system for achieving battlefield success.

For over ten years, *Blundering to Glory* by Owen Connelly has been a mainstay of college classrooms and professional military reading lists. This distinguished author is the McKissick Dial professor of history at the University of South Carolina and a past president of the Society for French Historical Studies. In addition, he is a member of Princeton University's prestigious Institute for Advanced Study, as well as an active member of the Society for Military History and the Consortium on Revolutionary Europe. Scholars and military professionals alike appreciated his original edition, published in 1987.

Owen Connelly is not one to engage in hero worship. In a fast moving, bare bones narrative, he strips away the heroic myths that often find their way into a discussion of this dominating personality. According to Connelly, the great Napoleon had no master plan that led to his opponents' defeat. His armies were no better than those of Austria and Prussia. He was no smarter than his rival generals. What made Napoleon successful, our author is convinced, was, first, that he was always active and looking for a way to get at his opponent. In addition, he simply would not accept defeat.

Once he decided to go to war, Bonaparte's campaigns were swift, though his operational plans were often vague. Connolly points out that even his great battles of Ulm and Jena-Auerstadt were won after the emperor's operational maneuvers had gone somewhat astray. However, surrounding himself with the most experienced and battle-hardened combat leaders in Europe, Napoleon could rightly expect that his generals and marshals could rectify whatever initial errors he made in the array of his forces. Once the battle was joined, often staring disaster in the face, he harnessed every ounce of his incredible energy to achieve tactical victory. In battle, at least in the campaigns before his marriage to the Austrian princess Maria-Louise, he was everywhere on the battlefield, pressing every gun, grenadier, and commander to the limit to turn the tide. With a little luck thrown in for good measure, Bonaparte could reasonably expect his army to dominate the field at the end of the day.

Connelly's term "blundering" may, in some cases, be a bit too harsh. Most of his mistakes on the battlefield were neither serious nor caused by stupidity. In most cases, they were the result of Napoleon's intense desire to find the enemy and bring him to battle. Connelly admits that Bonaparte usually prevailed in combat because of his ability to "scramble" and overcome the friction, fear, and inertia that confronted his forces. In modern management parlance, Napoleon thought "outside the box" and tried to bring new, innovative solutions to the problems he encountered. Given that most of his opponents were still intellectually mired in the military thought of the mid-eighteenth century, this operational and tactical whirlwind was more than enough to ensure most of the Corsican's victories.

Yet, blundering is exactly the right word to describe many of Bonaparte's political and strategic decisions. How else can one explain Trafalgar, the Spanish affair, and Napoleon's foray into Russia? According to Connelly, Napoleon conducted his entire Russian campaign by blunder and mismanagement, with an amazing lack of personal energy. Blundering is an even more accurate description of Bonaparte's political choices after crossing the Berezina in 1812, after Leipzig in 1813, and even during the final campaign in France in 1814. At any one of these points, he could have chosen peace and saved his regime. All that was left, in Connelly's words, was "the glorious irrelevance" of Waterloo that doomed Bonaparte to exile and elevated him forever into the halls of military glory.

This revision makes no substantive textual changes to the 1987 edition. Its twelve chronologically organized chapters discuss Napoleon's military experience from his youth until the last days after Waterloo. Its major contribution is a new preface that is essentially a historiographic essay on the state of Napoleonic scholarship. Any soldier or student seeking to pursue studies in this field should visit this essay first. In addition, Connelly has revised his bibliography to include the newest publications in this field.

This is not a work for the novice, and it brings with it certain limitations. It is generally an operational and tactical history, and Connelly assumes that the reader has a grasp of basic European history and geography.

He spends no time discussing the period's social, cultural, or even political situation. In addition, he devotes little attention to the details of Napoleonic warfare. How staffs and logistical units functioned, the details of his marshals' operations, and the finer points of small-unit tactics are left to others. Yet Connelly provides a superb analysis of battle from Napoleon's perspective.

Of course, few works please everyone, and this book has a few annoying quirks in the eyes of this reviewer. Most obvious are the maps that the editor should have replaced. While keeping maps simple holds down the cost, the ones in this book are quite primitive and seldom convey the author's point with the clarity it deserves. In addition, while Connelly cites most recent scholarship, he fails to use it in his revision. For example, his discussion of Waterloo is practically unchanged from the original edition, ignoring the important analysis of this battle provided by such books as David Hamilton-Williams's *Waterloo, New Perspectives: The Great Battle Reappraised* (New York, 1994). It is also interesting that he makes no comment on Alan Schom's popular, but much criticized, *Napoleon Bonaparte* (New York, 1997), a work bound to affect how people look at the emperor in the future. Finally, I would have hoped for a more extensive and detailed epilogue to display what this distinguished scholar has learned about this fascinating warrior in the last ten years.

If you do not have a copy of this superb work, now is a great chance to add it to your library. If you already own one of the originals, save your money unless you need Connelly's historiographic review. No matter which edition you choose, this fast-paced summary of Napoleon's campaigns should be in every professional's library.

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**Book Review**
**by Robert B. Bruce**

***The Note-Books of Captain Coignet***
***Soldier of the Empire, 1799–1816***
**by Jean-Roch Coignet**
**with an introduction by Sir John Fortescue**
**Stackpole Books, 1998, 292 pp., $19.95.**

The life of Captain Jean-Roch Coignet, who rose from the status of an illiterate peasant to that of a respected officer in one of the greatest armies in history, epitomizes the promise of Napoleonic France and provides an invaluable study of why men followed Emperor Napoleon I. Coignet's book stands, along with those of Captain Elzéar Blaze and Baron de Marbot,[1] among the best and most colorfully written memoirs to be produced by a soldier of Napoleon's fabled *Grande Armée*. It is a classic work of the genre. This particular edition of Coignet's *Note-Books* is a paperback reprint of the 1928 edition of the work, and as such it lacks the illustrations that were published with the earlier English edition of the book that appeared in 1897 and was reprinted in England by Worley Publications in 1996.

In his memoir Coignet relates his humble beginnings and tragic childhood, when the horrible treatment he received from his stepmother forced him to run away from home at an early age. Fortunately, Coignet found work with a family of horse traders, and his life greatly improved. When he was conscripted into the French Army in 1799, Coignet refused to allow his kind master to hire a substitute for him. With a combination of a sense of duty and a yearning for adventure, he announced to his adopted family, "I promise you that I will bring back a silver musket or die." (p. 52) A major shortcoming in this edition of Coignet's memoir is the failure to provide enough editorial notes for passages such as this. Napoleon was the first commander to introduce the use of medals and awards for enlisted men. One of the most treasured of these awards was a musket with a silver plate affixed to the stock and inscribed with a brief description of the heroic feat that its owner performed to win it. Coignet was referring to this award, and an editorial note to that effect would have proven extremely valuable.

The reader who is not well versed in the field of the

Napoleonic Wars will stumble over several similar passages in the book. For example, when Coignet relates the story of the birth of Napoleon's child in 1811, which was to be announced by the firing of cannon at the *Invalides*, he writes, "As the first reports sounded from the *Invalides*, we counted in silence, but when we heard the twenty-second and twenty-third report, we leaped for joy, and all shouted at once, 'Long live the Emperor.'" (p. 200) An editorial note explaining that twenty-one guns would mark the birth of a daughter to the emperor, but that 101 guns would be fired in honor of the birth of a son and heir to the empire, would have provided the context necessary to understand this dramatic event.

These editorial shortcomings aside, there is no questioning the literary quality of Coignet's writing or the exciting and dramatic life story that he relates. Coignet first engaged in battle at Montebello in Italy in 1800, and he recounts that in a moment of desperation he single-handedly charged an Austrian cannon, bayoneting all five of the gunners and capturing the gun. This dramatic feat brought him to the attention of Napoleon, at that time first consul of the French republic and commander in chief of the French army. Napoleon was so impressed with Coignet's feat that he informed him that, although Coignet was still too inexperienced to join his guard, he would keep an eye on him and make the young soldier a guardsman when the time was appropriate—a promise that Napoleon kept.

This incident is extremely revealing of Napoleon's personal style of command and the intimate relationship he enjoyed with his army. That Napoleon as commander in chief of the French Army would take note of a promising young officer may perhaps be expected, but that he would similarly track the career of a French private is simply astounding. Yet this in fact did occur, and three years later Coignet, having acquired the necessary time in service, received his promotion to what would become the most famous military unit in the world, the grenadiers of the Imperial Guard. Coignet states that he was actually too short to meet the height requirement of the guard, but before his initial inspection he placed a deck of playing cards in each of his shoes to boost himself up to the required stature.

During the course of his military career, Coignet would participate in no less than forty-nine engagements, including some of the greatest battles of the Napoleonic Wars—Jena, Eylau, Wagram, and Waterloo. Coignet does not boast about either his military career or his personal exploits and in fact is even somewhat self-deprecating at times. For example, he admits that he was somewhat self-conscious of his height. When he met a Russian grenadier during the festivities surrounding the peace of Tilsit, Coignet relates, "I was obliged to look up to see his face. I looked like a little boy beside him." (p. 155) Coignet also reveals that he was illiterate until the age of thirty-three, when, to make possible his promotion first to corporal and then to sergeant, his commanding officer assigned to him a team of seven privates as tutors who would teach him how to read and write.

By 1812 Coignet had risen to the rank of captain, and he served as an aide to Napoleon during the disastrous Russian campaign of that year. Coignet's memoir includes a stirring account of the Battle of Borodino before Moscow, where he participated in the final French attack that seized the great redoubt in the center of the Russian line, and a darkly disturbing account of the infamous French retreat from that city. Coignet remained steadfastly loyal to Napoleon even after Russia, and he remained assigned to the Emperor's staff during the 1813 campaign in Germany and the final defense of France in 1814. After Napoleon's abdication and exile to Elba, Coignet wandered aimlessly, but, when the emperor escaped from his island prison and returned to France in the spring of 1815, Coignet was one of those who once more rallied to his side. Coignet was again assigned to the emperor's staff for the climactic dénouement of the Napoleonic Wars, the Waterloo campaign. Once again, Coignet won favor by dramatically killing an English cavalry officer in single combat in front of the attentive eyes of the emperor and his staff.

After Napoleon's defeat and final exile, Coignet retired from the army. In 1818 he married a charming lady who owned a successful business and settled down. As Coignet was a suspected "Bonapartist," royalist police tracked his movements for many years, but while his heart remained in sympathy with Napoleon, he did not become politically active. In 1848, on Coignet's seventy-second birthday, his wife of thirty years passed away, leaving him alone and crestfallen. In an effort to divert his mind from his sufferings, he

committed himself to writing his life's story as a soldier in Napoleon's *Grande Armée* and produced *The Note-Books*.

Coignet's book provides both historians and the general public with an invaluable account of military service with the premier elite fighting force of the world during one of the most dramatic and colorful epochs in military history. In addition, Coignet provides an insider's glimpse at one of history's greatest commanders, Napoleon Bonaparte, revealing not only his military genius but also his human side and his great affection for the soldiers who served him. I highly recommend Coignet's work to anyone interested in this period of history or to the general reader who enjoys an exciting tale of a soldier and his exploits.

**NOTES**

1. For recent editions of Blaze and Marbot, see Elzéar Blaze, *Life in Napoleon's Army: The Memoirs of Captain Elzéar Blaze* (Mechanicsburg, Pa., 1995), and Jean-Baptiste-Antoine-Marcelin, baron de Marbot, *The Memoirs of Baron de Marbot, Late Lieutenant-General in the French Army*, 2 vols. (London, 1988).

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**Book Review**
**by Thomas Goss**

***Winfield Scott: The Quest for Military Glory***
**by Timothy D. Johnson.**
**University Press of Kansas, 1998, 315 pp., $35.**

When a triumphant General Winfield Scott entered the heart of Mexico City on 14 September 1847 to the sounds of a military band playing "Yankee Doodle," his place in the annals of military history as a brilliant military commander and strategist seemed assured. This success was the crowning achievement of a long career that guided the evolution of the U.S. Army from the debacles of the War of 1812 to the incredible 250-mile-drive from the U.S. Army's first true amphibious landing at Vera Cruz to the epic battles around the Mexican capital. Yet soon after this conquest, Scott was assailed by contemporary critics, and before long he was overshadowed by the famous generals of the Civil War. Few Americans, when asked about great American generals of the nineteenth century, think past Grant, Lee, and Sherman to recall Scott's battles at Lundy's Lane and Cerro Gordo. However, this historical favoritism can be remedied by a reading of Timothy D. Johnson's new biography, *Winfield Scott: The Quest for Military Glory*.

Johnson is an associate professor of history at Lipscomb University in Tennessee, and he brings a trained analytical ability and a penchant for in-depth research to his examination of Scott's life and times. The resulting work, *The Quest for Military Glory*, appears in the series of Modern War Studies published by University Press of Kansas. After the publication of Charles Winslow Elliott's 1937 biography, *Winfield Scott: The Soldier and the Man*, Scott was not the subject of a major study for more than a half-century. In 1997 John S. D. Eisenhower produced *Agent of Destiny: The Life and Times of General Winfield Scott*, a popular account that narrates the life of the general without either the deep analysis or in-depth research that Johnson's work provides. While Eisenhower guides the reader through many lesser known aspects of Scott's life with the skillful prose he has demonstrated in all his works, a more definitive biography awaited the publication of Johnson's thorough and enjoyable book.

Johnson leads the reader through a narrative of Scott's background and presents an analysis of how each historical event shaped the man and the general. Scott's impact on the Army officer corps, on American military tradition, and on the success of the nation's arms are considered chronologically and in detail, from the impact on American morale and strategy of Scott's attack at Lundy's Lane during the War of 1812 all the way to the significance of his 1861 "Anaconda Plan." While many other studies of Scott conclude soon after narrating the 1847 Mexico campaign, Johnson continues the story to examine and explain Scott's enormous impact over nearly half a century on the professionalization of the Army's officer corps and

on the direction of the American military. Johnson carefully places Scott in the context of his times by describing the political, social, and cultural forces that shaped his world.

Nevertheless, it is in his analysis of Scott's planning and generalship during the drive from Vera Cruz to Mexico City where Johnson's efforts to clarify and refute past interpretations make the most lasting impression. While not failing to present the general's many flaws, including his ambition, vanity, and aristocratic leanings that so infuriated his critics (and prejudiced some historians), Johnson explains the immense challenges Scott had to overcome during the drive on Mexico City. He therefore places Scott second behind George Washington among the nation's great generals. Johnson concludes that "Scott should have emerged from the war with an elevated reputation and the recognition of his rightful place among the greatest generals in American history." (p. 210) But an "eruption of egos" embroiled Scott, and his reputation declined from "the greatest living soldier," according to the Duke of Wellington, to "Old Fuss and Feathers," as he is commonly called today. This period of the general's life holds the greatest significance for Scott as a historical figure and is where Johnson's astute analysis and perceptive insights add most to our understanding.

The strength of this biography rests not only in its research and analysis, but also in its readability. Benefiting from a very interesting subject, the book is enjoyable to read. It is also one of the rare biographies that has good maps and illustrations that directly support the narrative. In summary, Johnson brings attention to one of the nation's first professional soldiers and great captains, and he does so in a way that reveals much about Scott, his impact, and the world in which he lived. Beyond simply enjoying the story of one of the greatest campaigns ever won by American arms, readers will learn about the growth of a general's talent and the evolution of his profession.

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**Book Review**
**by Stanley L. Falk**

***Hold the Marianas***
***The Japanese Defense of the Mariana Islands***
**by D. Colt Denfeld**
**White Mane Publishing Company, 1997, 250 pp. $29.95.**

For Japan's waning fortunes in the summer of 1944, the American conquest of the Marianas Islands was an unmitigated disaster. The great naval air battle that the American invasion precipitated destroyed the last elements of the once powerful striking force of the Japanese navy. The American navy in turn gained a major forward logistical base. Even more importantly, the Marianas provided ample sites for American airbases from which B–29 heavy bombers would wreak havoc on the heretofore sacrosanct Japanese home islands and a year later deliver the final, climactic nuclear strikes to end the long, bitter war. Finally, the fall of the Marianas would topple General Hideki Tojo's wartime government that had led the nation into hopeless conflict and resisted for so long any talk of making peace. The American victory, in short, was a decisive blow from which Japan could never recover.

The story of the Japanese loss of the Marianas has been recounted many times, usually from the American point of view, in both official and unofficial histories, many of which nevertheless include good coverage of the Japanese side of the battle. Dr. D. Colt Denfeld, however, for many years a historian with the Army Corps of Engineers in Alaska and a specialist on Micronesia, has chosen to tell the story again, primarily from the Japanese perspective. He thus provides only a good general account of the American side, concentrating instead on what the Japanese were thinking and doing.

This would have been a welcome addition to the literature had Denfeld exploited Japanese-language sources previously untapped by other western historians. Unfortunately, he has limited his research to English-language materials. While he has made good use of these, most of them have been well utilized by other historians before him. Thus, for an account focusing on the Japanese side, it is strange that Denfield ignored such sources as the official Japanese war

history, unofficial Japanese accounts, and still other unpublished Japanese materials, many of which are available on microfilm in our own National Archives. Nor has Denfeld consulted some English-language works that relied heavily on Japanese sources, such as Edward Drea's volume on ULTRA, Paul Dull's history of the World War II Japanese navy, and even John Toland's sweeping account of Japan's war effort. The reader who seeks new material in Denfeld's study will thus be frustrated and disappointed.

Despite this major shortcoming, *Hold the Marianas* is still a good brief narrative of Japanese plans and actions and of the experiences of many individual Japanese. Furthermore, unlike other historians of the Marianas battle, Denfeld has relied heavily on archaeological and historical preservation publications as well as his own on-the-ground surveys of the major islands of the Marianas. He thus is able to offer impressive details about the terrain and topography and the nature of the Japanese defenses not readily available elsewhere. Nearly five dozen photographs, constituting one quarter of the book's pages, further reveal extensive information about Japanese defensive positions: trenches, fortifications, weapon sites, camouflage techniques, and so forth.

Denfeld also provides good background material on the Spanish, German, and Japanese occupations of the islands. Then, after a brief general account of Japanese and, to a lesser extent, American military plans and preparations for the Marianas, he describes the naval battle that opened the operations and in turn the fights for Saipan, Tinian, and Guam. His Guam narrative also includes an account of the Japanese capture of that island at the start of the war. He concludes with a brief account of the battle's aftermath and a description of the present state of those Japanese defenses and war artifacts that still remain on the islands—a surprising amount half a century later.

The short chapter on the naval battle of the Marianas illustrates the problem of Denfeld's attempt to describe Japanese operations without using Japanese sources. Based almost entirely on Samuel Eliot Morison's 1953 volume covering the battle, it ignores Dull's authoritative later account as well as a few other useful English-language sources. The barely five pages devoted to the crucial sea battle thus offer very little on Japanese plans and not much more on their operations—including the significant fact that U.S. forces were in possession of these plans. One of the intriguing questions about this sea battle is why Vice Adm. Kakuji Kakuta, commanding Japanese land-based air units in the Marianas, kept feeding Admiral Ozawa false information about the status of his forces, information that he knew to be false and that seriously misled Ozawa. Denfeld mentions this strange behavior once in passing but makes no effort to explain it, despite its evident effect on Ozawa's actions.

The chapters covering the land fighting are more detailed and much better. The Japanese material, given the limitations described above, is skillfully used. And there is a nice, albeit brief, explanation and analysis of Japanese "failures" in the battle. But the documentation is uneven and often inadequate, and the maps also leave something to be desired. *Hold the Marianas*, in sum, is disappointing and offers the reader far less than its dust-jacket blurb promises.

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**Book Review**
**by Michael A. Boden**

***From Nazi Test Pilot to Hitler's Bunker***
***The Fantastic Flights of Hanna Reitsch***
**by Dennis Piszkiewicz**
**Praeger, 1997, 149 pp., $22.95.**

Hanna Reitsch certainly merits a place in the history of the twentieth century as a strong woman whose life was filled with challenges and marked by adventures that culminated in Hitler's bunker during the final days and hours of the Third Reich. Dennis Piszkiewicz sets out to tell her story and to explore the trials of her life. Unfortunately, this work neither does complete justice to Hanna Reitsch nor fulfills the author's stated intentions. While Piszkiewicz's account has some strong elements, for the most part it fails to illuminate what animated Reitsch, and the reader finishes the book without really understanding much about her.

Hanna Reitsch was, in truth, quite an astonishing woman, as Piszkiewicz points out. She flew numerous aircraft, mostly in the role of test pilot, and set a number of aviation records. She served Hitler's regime faithfully during its entire existence. She was injured on a number of occasions and was the only female recipient of the Iron Cross, First Class, during the Second World War. Her wartime experiences culminated in her presence at the Berlin bunker on 28 April 1945, just hours before the final events of Hitler's life. Piszkiewicz does a satisfactory job narrating this climactic story. In other areas, however, there are considerable shortcomings.

In his introduction, Piszkiewicz poses a number of questions that he wishes to address in the book, most of them regarding the struggles of a woman in the male world of Nazi Germany. The author writes, "Why couldn't she accept her designated role of wife and breeder of future members of the master race? What drove her to excel in a male-dominated world as an aircraft test pilot? What led her to become a close associate of the Nazi leadership and, in the end, an intimate member of Hitler's inner circle?" (p. x) Unfortunately, the author does little to address these questions in the course of the book.

Perhaps Piszkiewicz fails in his attempt to write a historical biography because as a scientist and teacher of college-level chemistry and biochemistry, he does not have the historical training to analyze his material to answer his own questions. For example, many of his sources are autobiographies, among them those of Otto Skorzeny and Leni Riefenstahl, but the author spends little time addressing any biases these biographies may have. This is particularly evident with his use of Hanna Reitsch's personal writings. Piszkiewicz unfortunately seems to take Reitsch's word without question, as demonstrated in his discussion of specific criticisms leveled at Hanna by her male compatriots. On one occasion, she is criticized for flying "with her heart and not with her brains—at least without critical understanding of her work." She is accused of being vain, arrogant, and selfish to the point of being detrimental to the success of the experimental aircraft unit's mission. But Piszkiewicz dismisses these accusations with no analysis or study of the opposing view: "How much truth there was in these criticisms leveled at Hanna by the male pilots is not known. . . . What is obvious, though, is that they did not want her as part of their group." (p. 53) Piszkiewicz does acknowledge, however, that Reitsch's writings lack "introspection or analysis of the moral consequences of her actions on behalf of the Third Reich." (p. 124) For the historian, this does little to provide an examination of these questions.

Complimentary to the problematic scholarly research is the author's confusing footnote style. While understanding that in many cases an author is constrained by the requests of editors, the format of this book seems more complicated than most. Footnotes are not sequential, and Piszkiewicz's selected bibliography is woefully short, not listing all of the works that he cites in footnotes. In addition, there are numerous cases of quoted exchanges supported by no documentation at all, particularly during the chapters on the final days of the war, when such conversations seem most intriguing and worthy of further study. The reader is left questioning the validity and legitimacy of these passages. Perhaps the most problematic single example is footnote 36 on page 102 (followed in the next paragraph by footnote 24), which cites simply "Various secondary sources."

An important aspect of Reitsch's life that Piszkiewicz fails to address adequately is her conception of honor and loyalty. Although he does not explicitly state that exploring this theme will be one of his goals, Piszkiewicz frequently returns to Hanna's belief system to attempt to explain her actions. Honor and loyalty are concepts that the author addresses occasionally during the course of the book, but he provides the reader with only a brief, simplistic discussion of Reitsch's values and passions. An examination that could very easily have proven compatible with an analysis of the role of women in the Third Reich is relegated to a second-rate afterthought in his work. Reitsch changes the focus of her loyalty throughout her life: from God to the Fatherland, to fellow flyers, to the *Luftwaffe*, and finally to Hitler himself. Piszkiewicz nowhere explains exactly what determined her shifting loyalties and, more important, how her changing conceptions affected her life.

A word should be said about some positive aspects of this book. Although lacking in historical analysis, Piszkiewicz does an admirable job of describing the key events in German aviation development during the war years, including their technical aspects. Hand-in-

hand with this advancement went the daily perils faced by the test pilots. One gains an appreciation for all they had to experience and the risks they took. Piszkiewicz also provides a clear chronological framework for this development. Moreover, the reader seldom feels that he is lost in relation to the progress of the war.

The outcome is a book that consists chiefly of facts and information, presents interesting technical descriptions, and is fairly well written but fails to provide any analysis or evaluation of Hanna Reitsch as a person. The critical questions concerning her role as a woman in the German military apparatus are regrettably glossed over, as the author never answers the key questions he asked at the outset of the book. There are quite a few areas where in-depth discussions would have been warranted, among them her flight training as a youth, her dealings with Otto Skorzeny, and her postwar treatment by both historians and journalists. The author, however, goes little further in his analysis than to explain, using Hitler's words to Reitsch, that discrimination "was unfortunately the fate of many women." (p. 117) In the end, the reader is disappointed. While this book's subject was a remarkable aviatrix, its lack of historical analysis or probing examination of her life relegates it to one that is of value only for those interested in the technical and chronological aspects of the German aviation program during the Third Reich. A definitive analysis of Hanna Reitsch's life and career has yet to be written.

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**Book Review**
**by Harold E. Raugh, Jr.**

***Citizen Soldiers: The U.S. Army from the Normandy Beaches to the Bulge to the Surrender of Germany, June 7, 1944, to May 7, 1945***
**by Stephen E. Ambrose**
**Simon and Schuster, 512 pp.**
**cloth, 1997, $27.50; paper, 1998, $16.00.**

Professor Stephen E. Ambrose's highly acclaimed *Citizen Soldiers*—the sequel to his enthralling *D-Day: June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II*—has now been published, with the addition of a new afterword, in paperback, thus making this book available to an even larger audience. Highly lauded and a riveting read, *Citizen Soldiers* is not a study of generalship or strategy but "is about the GIs, the junior officers and enlisted men of ETO [European Theater of Operations]—who they were, how they fought, why they fought, what they endured, how they triumphed." (p. 13)

From the hedgerows of Normandy, to the Siegfried Line, and through the Hürtgen Forest and the wintry Ardennes, battling their course inexorably eastward across the Rhine to the Danube and Elbe Rivers, the American citizen soldiers fought indefatigably and gallantly. Experienced German soldiers, rugged terrain, and terrible winter weather, coupled with periodic logistical shortages, challenged but never halted the American fighting men. The American soldiers, fighting for their buddies and squads and platoons, also "knew they were fighting for decency and democracy and they were proud of it and motivated by it." (p. 14)

In writing this book, Ambrose has retained the formula proven so successful in some of his earlier volumes. He has culled interesting quotes and passages from memoirs, reminiscences, and oral histories of American (and some German) World War II veterans, donated to the Eisenhower Center at the University of New Orleans. These vignettes, along with selected passages from published books, have been woven into a narrative organized chronologically and topically. Examples of the latter sections, which provide insight on support troops and various other soldiers, include "Replacements and Reinforcements, Fall, 1944"; "The Air War"; "Medics, Nurses, and Doctors"; and "Jerks, Sad Sacks, and Jim Crow."

In letting the soldiers "speak for themselves" through their anecdotes and oral histories, the author holds unequivocally that "They speak with an authenticity no one else can match." (p. 13) This assertion is highly questionable. Oral histories and reminiscences, including those made days and, even more so, those made decades or even a half-century after the event, are frequently and unintentionally of dubious accuracy and veracity. Over time, memories fade, are influenced

by external factors (books, movies, etc.), become embellished, or transform into one's perception of what should have happened, rather than what actually did happen. This is not meant to detract in any way from the courage, perseverance, and outstanding accomplishments of the soldiers depicted in this study, but to point out the potential shortcomings of oral reminiscences and recollections.

Many of the soldiers' oral histories and reminiscences recounted in this study sound very similar to "war stories." (Indeed, the author states on p. 471 that he heard his "first war stories" from World War II veterans in 1947 and has "been listening ever since.") These selective recollections are noteworthy not only for what they include, but frequently for what they do not mention. For example, not all U.S. Sherman tanks in the ETO had 75-mm. guns; there were many modified M4A3s with 76-mm. guns to better counter German tanks. The U.S. Army also had superb tank destroyers—never mentioned in the book—with 76-mm. and 90-mm. guns. In Chapter 10, "Night on the Line," Ambrose states, "the principal characteristic of the front line was how quiet it was. . . . Nor was there much movement." (p. 253) In reality, nighttime was a period of significant activity, when hot chow was brought up to the soldiers (another topic not mentioned in the book), ammunition was resupplied, wounded soldiers were evacuated, soldiers at observation posts were rotated, and patrolling was actively pursued. Ambrose's treatment of replacement reception is also somewhat misleading, as many company-level infantry leaders received and treated their new soldiers much better than portrayed. Nonetheless, the bottom line is that the citizen-soldiers knew what they were supposed to do, and they did their job well.

The subtitle of this book, *The U.S. Army from the Normandy Beaches to the Bulge to the Surrender of Germany, June 7, 1944, to May 7, 1945*, and the author's stated intent to tell the story of the soldiers in the ETO, need some clarification. *Citizen Soldiers* focuses on the soldiers and operations of Hodges' First Army and Patton's Third Army, which became operational on 1 August 1944, while virtually ignoring the activities and achievements of Patch's Seventh Army, which landed in southern France on 15 August 1944, and Simpson's Ninth Army, which became operational on 5 September 1944. This also results in a somewhat skewed portrayal of the ETO.

Some historians seem obsessed with the purported superior fighting quality of the German Wehrmacht and find it difficult to explain the eventual success of the U.S. Army in World War II. Many academicians attribute the American victory to an overwhelming preponderance of firepower and materiel. Ambrose, however, hits the target when he properly gives the lion's share of the credit for the American success to the battle-hardened, resilient, and courageous combat infantrymen.

It was this generation of citizen soldiers, memorialized by Ambrose through its members' own words, who fought, bled, and died, if necessary, to stop Hitler and Tojo. This same generation, after surviving the horrors of war, ensured through their determination, discipline, and teamwork the perpetuation of their hard-fought legacy of peace, freedom, and prosperity. These men, contrary to contemporary concepts of political correctness, were truly "the men who built modern America." (p. 472) Because of their uncompromising values and deeply inculcated sense of duty, these Americans "fought, and won, and we all of us, living and yet to be born, must be forever profoundly grateful." (p. 473)

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**Book Review**
**by Conrad Crane**

***The United States and Biological Warfare***
***Secrets from the Early Cold War and Korea***
**by Stephen Endicott and Edward Hagerman**
**Indiana University Press, 1998, 275 pp., $29.95.**

The main value of this book is to serve as a prime example of bad history. The authors obviously began their research with the intent to prove that the United States did employ biological warfare against Com-

munist foes during the Korean War. Both are Canadian historians, and Stephen Endicott's father, a missionary in China, was among the earliest Western supporters of Communist allegations of germ warfare. The authors twist facts, ignore contradictory evidence, and grasp at straws to reach their foregone conclusion. In the process they compile a tangled web of circumstantial evidence that will never all be disproved and indict the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, Far East Command, Far East Air Forces, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Central Intelligence Agency, among others. Nevertheless, the authors have to admit, "Clear and identifiable direct evidence that the United States experimented with biological weapons in the Korean War is not available in the U.S. archives as they presently exist for public scrutiny." (p. 188, italics removed)

They begin their investigation with a core of truthful revelations. They do very well showing that the U.S. Defense Department was trying to improve its biological warfare capability at the time of the Korean War. Civilian and military research funds and efforts were considerably increased. A shameful deal had already been struck to pardon the Japanese veterans of the notorious Unit 731 in return for the information obtained from their bacteriological "experiments" on prisoners and Chinese civilians. Since the U.S. government covered up these efforts, the authors assume it concealed much more, and they are skeptical of any official statements or positions.

Unfortunately the authors do not treat the other side the same way, basing their case heavily on evidence provided by the North Koreans and Chinese, while failing to mention that many of the documents are questionable at best and forgeries at worst. Recent revelations from the Soviet archives indicate that mid-level Chinese and Russian operatives faked much evidence. They created false infestation maps, injected condemned prisoners with diseases, and buried infected bodies that could be exhumed later to support epidemic claims. Their efforts were used to convince carefully selected observers that the United States had indeed employed bacteriological warfare. When the post-Stalin government found out about the deception by April 1953, the Soviets feared revelations of the truth could embarrass them and made the Chinese and North Koreans cease their accusations. The authors might make the excuse that the new information came out too late for them to incorporate into their book, but that does not explain why they did not mention the detailed scientific refutation of evidence that was provided at the time. For instance, the authors reproduce some Chinese photographs and captions in their book without mentioning the April 1952 *New York Times* rebuttal that convincingly demonstrated flaws in the pictures and accompanying accusations. The best and most balanced sources of information on the biological warfare allegations incorporating the newest evidence are articles by Kathryn Weathersby and Milton Leitenberg in Issue 11 (Winter 1998) of the *Cold War International History Project Bulletin (CWIHPB)*.

Endicott and Hagerman also do not understand the nature and course of military operations. They suspect any classified intelligence-gathering mission as somehow being connected to the delivery of biological weapons. After finding out that leaflet bombs were considered as a delivery means for infected materials, they imply that psychological warfare drops were really dispensing germs and not propaganda pamphlets. In perhaps their most ludicrous claim, they argue that F–86 Sabre jet fighters were not rushed to Korea to counter enemy MiG–15s, but instead were brought in because they were the most efficient platform from which to drop bacteriological munitions. The authors also take a highly questionable position on the accuracy of biological warfare confessions coerced from American pilots in Communist prisons. Endicott and Hagerman argue that since, in their opinion, the airmen were not subjected to much abuse in the POW camps, but were pressured strongly to deny the allegations when they were repatriated, the recantations are actually less believable than the original confessions!

The Defense and State Departments denied the germ warfare accusations when they first appeared in early 1952 and have continued to do so. Yet polemics like this book disguised as impartial history continue to seduce the unwary. Unfortunately, as John Ellis van Courtland Moon has remarked about biological warfare accusations, "Once an allegation is made, it is impossible to disprove it completely, since the nature of the weapon makes it almost invisible. If it is difficult to prove it has been used, it is impossible to prove that it has not." (quoted by Leitenberg in *CWIHPB*, no. 11, p. 195)

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**Book Review**
**by Mason R. Schaefer**

***Victory at Any Cost***
***The Genius of Viet Nam's Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap***
**by Cecil B. Currey**
**Brassey's, Inc., 432 pp., paper, 1998, $21.95.**

General Vo Nguyen Giap has long inspired controversy. During thirty years of warfare (1945–1975), his Vietnamese guerrilla armies bested superior French and American conventional forces. While Ho Chi Minh supplied political leadership, Giap directed the military drive. Cecil Currey's sympathetic but fair biography well describes the general's tumultuous life.

Currey is a senior University of South Florida history professor who also served as a reserve colonel in the U.S. Army. Like most biographers, he immerses himself in his subject. For this book, he interviewed General Giap and many other Vietnamese military officials. He thus adds details other historians have missed. Though he does not answer every question, he brings us closer to Giap than do most other scholars. No hagiographer, Currey notes Giap's flaws as well as his strengths.

The author's tightly written narrative covers many complex events economically and vividly but does not bog down in minutiae. Storytelling aside, Currey has relied heavily on secondary sources. These works include Giap's own several memoirs. The author also draws on such familiar authors as Joseph Buttinger and Bernard Fall, along with the recollections of prominent Vietnamese like Bao Dai. His original research includes interviews with American as well as Vietnamese participants. Though it is perhaps inevitable, his heavy reliance on Giap's own writings and interviews have colored his approach toward the general. At the same time, he overcompensates when describing Giap's faults, as if he wanted to prove his objectivity.

That said, the author considers General Giap one of the great captains of history—and the greatest of the twentieth century. Starting with virtually nothing, he built effective Vietnamese armies from the ground up. "His record is unparalleled and his results are extraordinary. That is military genius," Currey concludes. Many other historians agree, although some do so grudgingly. Others have evaded this diminutive giant. In *The Twenty-Five-Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam*, General Bruce Palmer mentions Giap exactly once. Diplomatic historian Paul Kattenberg omits him entirely. Others, like George C. Herring, place him mainly in the context of Dien Bien Phu and the French Indochina War. Still others credit him as logistician—he supplied large forces using exceedingly primitive methods, including elephants—but not as strategist or tactician. To Harry Summers and others, he threw troops heedlessly against impenetrable enemy formations. As they see it, his indifference to casualties made him a callous commander.

In contrast, Currey gives Giap full credit as a strategist, tactician, and logistician. Giap devised the military strategy that first defeated the French colonial forces and then the Americans. Giap pursued political as well as military ends, raising his forces' national consciousness with Communist ideology. With a nation in arms, he waged a war of the masses. In addition, Giap aimed his offensives at his enemy's home front. Fighting only when he wanted and pulling back when he chose, he made the price of holding Vietnam excessive for both the French and the Americans. To Giap, his goals of a united, independent Vietnam were worth any price. He took great risks and tolerated heavy casualties to achieve this end. Dienbienphu exemplifies his boldness; his forces pulled heavy artillery through "impassable" jungles and mountains to besiege a strong French force supported by air power. Despite high losses and internal dissension, the Viet Minh prevailed.

Currey acknowledges Giap's defeats as well as his victories. For example, that commander's mass attacks on well-equipped enemy forces often failed badly. In 1951 his headlong assaults did not break French positions near the Day River and Vinh Yen. The Viet Cong's 1968 Tet offensive met a major repulse. In 1972 stiffening South Vietnamese resistance and American air power stalled the North Vietnamese

Easter offensive. Giap overestimated his forces' drive in each of these cases.

However, as Currey directly or indirectly observes, these defeats enabled Giap's victories. The frontal attacks initially stunned the French and Americans and nearly succeeded at various points. Moreover, they revealed enemy weaknesses that guided Giap to final victory. After Tet, for example, the United States did not fight to win, but only to support its withdrawal. The failed Easter offensive almost routed the South Vietnamese; American air strikes combined with North Vietnamese tactical errors stalled the attacks. All enhanced Giap's strategy of fighting when he chose to fight, breaking off actions when necessary, and eroding the enemy's will to win.

Currey describes Giap's early career more fully than do many historians. From 1943 to 1945 his emerging forces stood off the more powerful French and Japanese. Some historians minimize the Viet Minh's pre-1945 operations, but their very survival helped Giap build a victorious army. Over half of Currey's narrative concerns the general's early career, while he covers the American war more succinctly. This approach illuminates the forces behind Giap.

The author discusses the general's personal life as well as his official career. Overall, Giap put country ahead of family. Though the general married twice and sired several children, he remained wedded to his cause. He could be tender, but did never lost his sense of mission. Something of an egomaniac, writes Currey, he enjoyed the sound of his own voice; at Communist Party conventions, he would orate interminably on North Vietnamese military tactics. Nonetheless, he inspired his troops to almost impossible deeds.

Occasional flaws aside, Currey has produced a very solid, readable work. Some historians cover Giap sporadically, while others minimize his contributions. Currey has provided a significant corrective. For those and other reasons, *Victory at Any Cost* will be a standard work in years to come.

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